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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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24 November 1982

# USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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## WARSAW PACT AND GROUPS OF FORCES

### TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 82 (signed to press 18 Jun 82) pp 25-31

[Article by Lt Gen N. Shevkun, military council member and chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces: "In Competing, to Grow Morally"]

[Text] The Political Directorate was to examine the activities of a unit's political departments in the area of uniting the military collectives and strengthening discipline. The evening before a group of our workers had been present in the unit's subunits and studied the state of affairs on the spot. The officers from the political directorate had approached an assessment of the effectiveness of party political work considering not only the quantity and quality of measures carried out, but primarily the attitude of the men toward military duty and toward performing their duties. Such an approach made it possible to more accurately determine the effective work of each commander and political worker and each party organization related to the political, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel and the formation of a healthy moral atmosphere in the collectives.

I felt that the report by the political department's chief would be marked by instructive analysis and by profound generalizations and conclusions. But, unfortunately, my hopes were not met. His speech abounded in a listing of measures, all sorts of figures and comparisons with previous indicators. Particularly disconcerting was the fact that only in passing, as if incidentally, he mentioned the influence of the socialist competition on uniting the men and strengthening proper order. Was this oversight accidental? Of course not. The workers from the political body had underestimated the indoctrinational role of the competition and for this reason were not working to maximally realize the possibilities contained in it. They had to be corrected.

This instance, certainly, was not typical for the Southern Group of Forces, but it shows the necessity for the leadership of the socialist competition to pay more attention to its moral aspect. All the more as the preparations for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR provide extensive opportunities for this.

Our party has always viewed and does view the socialist competition as a powerful means to mobilize the people in carrying out the tasks of communist construction, for indoctrinating the people, for developing their creative initiative and disclosing their talents and abilities. "In it," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "are formed the images of an understanding of social duty, heroism and self-sacrifice in labor." The May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, having proposed the extensive USSR Food Program for the period up to 1990, as one of the important measures in implementing it mentioned the further development of the socialist competition. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR" demands that we constantly improve the entire organizational level of the competition.

In carrying out the party's requirements, the military council and the political directorate of the group of forces has seen to it that the competition encompasses all spheres of life and activity for the personnel and that it contribute to creating in each military collective a proper moral-political climate, a situation of a creative search for new reserves, comradely mutual aid, high responsibility for the carrying out of duties, implacability against shortcomings and violations of discipline. In summing up the results of the winter training period, we concentrated the command and political personnel on utilizing the opportunities of the competition more fully both to improve military skills and to bring the lagging units and subunits up to the level of the advanced ones as well as for the political, moral and cultural growth of the men. Many commanders, political bodies and party organizations, in skillfully organizing the competition to properly celebrate the glorious jubilee of the USSR, strengthened its indoctrinational impact in the aim of achieving high results in military and political training, for strengthening discipline, for raising combat readiness and for shaping an activist attitude in the life of the servicemen.

This is the case, in particular, in the Guards Twice Red Banner and Order of Suvorov Volnovakha Motorized Rifle Regiment. The conscientious military service by the personnel in the leading unit has been recognized by the Pennant of the USSR Minister of Defense for Courage and Military Valor. The collective is successfully carrying out the tasks of the summer training period and is fulfilling its socialist obligations. Here, everyone, from the commander to the soldier, has clearly realized that an indispensable condition for achieving high end results in the struggle to strengthen the combat readiness of the home regiment is conscientiousness in carrying out military duty, aware discipline and sociopolitical activeness on the part of each man. Along with ideological work, the competition also helps to develop such an understanding.

A common great goal of confirming the title of the leading unit in the Southern Group of Forces has unified the collective. The commanders and political workers have taught the men to view their personal obligations envisaging participation in the struggle to carry out the legacy of the great Lenin and the party's demands, for the honor and dignity of the motherland's defender and the broadening of ideological and political views, as the main ones. A moral return from the competition starts with the fact that in the regiments the obligations are developed creatively and are not dictated from above. The men have an opportunity to reflect on everything, to weigh things and show initiative.

The comprehensibility and feasibility of the designated goals encourage the men to devote all their energy to achieving them and create a good basis for the ideological-political, military and moral improvement of the competition's participants.

The activeness of a person's moral position, as is known, is expressed in loyalty to communist ideals, in a unity of word and deed and in his ability to put common interests higher than personal ones. In agitation and propaganda work and in summing up the results of the competition in the unit they constantly emphasize that what has been set in the socialist obligations can be achieved only with flawless service and discipline on the part of each soldier, sergeant, warrant officer ["praporshchik"] and officer. This question is constantly raised by the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists and the agitators. A general concern for the regiment's honor helps to maintain a situation of mutual aid, mutual exactingness and implacability for shortcomings in the collective.

When Guards Sr Lt Yu. Platonov showed poor results in an inspection firing, he tried to pass this off as an accident. But the battalion commander, Guards Maj P. Zakharov and the party organization carefully analyzed the reasons for the failure. It turned out that Platonov had neglected training drills and had not tried to fight for first place in the competition. At their meeting the communists condemned Platonov's conduct and pointed out to him the inacceptability of a discrepancy between word and deed. At a meeting of the battalion officers he had to listen to just rebukes for a negligent attitude toward carrying out his military duty.

After this particular instance the party committee members examined the negative phenomenon of which not only this officer had been guilty. They heard a report by the battalion chief of staff, the CPSU member, Guards Sr Lt S. Zemlyanushkin on his involvement in organizing the socialist competition among the officers. The problem was that the communist leader had limited himself to merely collecting data on the fulfillment of obligations and forwarding them to the regimental staff. He had not effectively delved into the course of the competition. They helped Officer Zemlyanushkin eliminate the shortcomings and dealt severely with him. And he fundamentally altered his attitude toward the job.

High exactingness in the regiment is placed on all men, without exception. The slightest violations of the disciplinary requirements or the moral standards in the moral code of a builder of communism are not only considered in summing up the results of the competition, but are also widely publicized and a condemning public opinion is organized against them. The men are constantly reminded of the incompatibility of deviations from the requirements of communist morality, the regulations and the oath with the honor and dignity of an armed defender of the motherland. The relationships and conduct of the motorized rifle troops and the questions of the cultural and moral growth of each man are watched by the commanders, the political workers and party activists. This helps to develop in the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers a need to thoroughly analyze their deeds, accomplishments and oversights as well as an understanding of their personal responsibility for the collective's cause. If a soldier himself conscientiously and with great involvement carries out his own

duty and socialist obligations, then he also demands this from his comrades, he helps them in training and service and is not afraid to say the truth bluntly. Such an organization of indoctrination forms a close-knit and morally strong collective which can carry out the most complicated tasks.

Here I have intentionally focused attention not on mass measures of which many are carried out in the unit, but rather on the so-called daily working contacts in the subunits. Precisely through such contacts and not from questionnaire data it is possible to thoroughly study the men, influence them, convince them and help them get free of the unnecessary and superficial. All the positive that has been achieved in the regiment has been possible largely due to precisely the fact that the regimental commander, the political worker and the party committee members, having planned their work carefully, conduct it chiefly in the companies and platoons, that is, where the high moral-political qualities are formed, where the combat skill of the men is forged and fate of the socialist obligations determined.

The regiment observes the Leninist principles of publicizing the competition, the comparison of results achieved in it and the practical repetition of advanced experience and comradely mutual aid. The work of the men is judged exactly and properly. In summing up the results, the commanders not only consider the indicators of combat training but also ascertain for what reason one or another soldier, sergeant, warrant officer or officer has emerged as the victor and what out of the experience of the pacesetters can be borrowed for the others. Here they take into account the moral aspect of military rivalry, conduct and relationships, that is, how the man behaved in a difficult period for the collective, how he responded to a comrade's failure, how he helped him and whether or not he remained indifferent to negligence. The party and Kom-somol activists, in propagandizing the experience of the victors in talks, through the wall press, the local radio and visual agitation, bring out the moral motives which guided the men in the struggle to carry out the obligations and in the overall success of the subunit and unit. In criticizing the negligent, they assess their failings from collectivist positions, and condemn the actions and deeds which characterize sociopolitical passivity of a person.

In remembering that discipline is a political or moral category, in the unit they have made it a rule in determining the results of the competition to consider the state of discipline in the subunits. Let me give the following instance. According to the results of the last training year, one of the companies took first place in the regiment. Several months later it was in sixth place because Guards Pvt Yu. Matsulevich had committed a disciplinary infraction here. The question arises: isn't such an approach too strict? We feel that it is not, for it increases the responsibility of each soldier to the collective and that of the collective to each man and persuades the men that without strong, conscious discipline it is impossible either for the man or the subunit to achieve what has been planned in the competition.

The experience acquired in the leading regiment clearly shows that the mobilizing and indoctrinational role of the competition is more fully apparent where it in fact has become a school for moral growth and contributes to developing initiative, enthusiasm and the sociopolitical activeness of the men.



The effect of the competition's influence on the moral growth of the men is directly dependent upon how well the competition is organized. If the commanders entrusted with leading it have thoroughly studied Lenin's works, the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on the questions of organizing the competition, then they, as a rule, ably organize military rivalry among their subordinates. Consequently, an ignorance of the leading documents contributes to a situation where vital indoctrinational work with the men is replaced by the generating of paperwork, the collecting of information, general appeals and totally unobliging hazy talks about improving things. As a consequence, the competition loses strength and the initiative of the men is dulled.

At times, when the question is brought up of the spiritual effect of the competition on the men, one can hear such an opinion: it is important to create professional-like rivalry for specific indicators in combat training, but this, supposedly, in and of itself does not leave any trace in the human soul. In part, this is true. But to rely completely on letting things drift in such a vital matter means to doom it beforehand to failure. The indoctrinational possibilities of the competition should be realized by its organizers.

In the unit where Officer V. Konstantinov serves, in the service meetings and party sessions much is said about the need to increase the indoctrinational role of the competition. But as yet, there has not been the desired effect. One of the reason, in our view, lies in the fact that here they do not reach each man and do not ignite the enthusiasm of the men's hearts and minds. Often they rely solely on administrative measures, in making far from the best use of persuasion. At times the obligations are adopted hurriedly and are little related to the tasks of the military collectives and have an imprecise nature. The men are not explained the incentive principles lying in the socialist competition. Hence not all the soldiers and sergeants knew that they could win the chest insignia "Outstanding Man of the Soviet Army" for excellent indicators over two training periods and that those receiving this insignia were granted advantages in admission to military schools and promotion. The officers and warrant officers were not informed that those whose subunits for at least 2 years had been outstanding could be submitted for state decorations and the early awarding of military ranks and had advantages in admission to higher military schools.

As a result of all these oversights, the effectiveness of the competition was reduced and in certain men and collectives, the word began to diverge from the deed. It was no accident that of the four companies which had assumed obligations to become outstanding, only one achieved the set goal. The young officers I. Beretennikov, V. Sergeyev and V. Loktionov were among violators of military discipline. Guards Lts V. Glushchenko and V. Chudinov did not show proper zeal in service. The subunits which they commanded did not excel in organization and did not carry out the socialist obligations.

Here the basic evil was formalism in the competition. How else to explain the fact that there was not extensive and constant publicizing of the personnel's military service without which it is impossible to actually repeat positive experience. The results of the competition in the unit were given to the men but

without the proper analysis. The results of carrying out the obligations were summed up irregularly. In determining the winners, basically the indicators of combat training were considered. Discipline, political preparation, the ideological, moral and cultural growth of the men was mentioned only in passing.

The military council and political directorate of the group of forces, along with studying and introducing all that is new, advanced and born out of the competition, carefully study the reasons for negative phenomena and elaborate specific recommendations on how to eliminate them. In particular, there has been strict condemnation of a situation where certain communists, including the leaders, speak extremely rarely to the men and are not in contact with them in an unforced situation. Thus, the staff officers of the lagging unit described above were rarely in the companies, they had little knowledge of the requests, needs and attitudes of the men and for this reason did not best influence their service and discipline or the development of activeness in the competition. Such isolation gives rise to a lack of objectivity in assessing the results of the collective's labor and, naturally, their own.

Probably nothing so harms the moral indoctrination of the men as the desire of individual leaders to embellish the true state of affairs or to give knowingly overstated grades. For instance, the personnel in the battalion under the command of Capt M. Monastyrskiy assumed high obligations for weapons training. The commander, in organizing the exercises, showed little exactingness and trained the officers poorly. But in summing up the results of the firing he did not forget to increase the percentage of hit targets by repeating the exercises. The "honor of the regiment" was higher than everything for him. This was also the concern of Sr Lt S. Tashayev who increased the weapons training grades for his subordinates. An inspection put everything in its place and the grades were reduced. But it is not so easy to eliminate those consequences which such a practice leaves in the moral atmosphere of a subunit. Certainly the men are very sensitive to the moral harm of such actions and these can cause indifference, irresponsibility and hypocrisy in them.

Although rarely it still does happen that men who clearly do not meet the set requirements get entered in the ranks of outstanding men and class specialists. Is it any surprise when the exemplary "beacons" several days later after the signing of the order receive unsatisfactory grades in military and political training or violate military discipline? Need it be said that such deviations from the generally accepted standards cause tangible moral harm.

An objective assessment of the results of military service, like no other means, increases the weight of the moral incentives for the competitors. Honesty and justness in giving the grades develop a spirit of healthy rivalry in the men and a constant desire for new heights and cause them to analyze their deeds and actions critically and from moral positions. This is why we thwart any attempts to overstate grades or obvious stretching of the point and eradicate oversimplification and weaknesses from the life and training of the troops. Certainly the competition is a contest, a rivalry based on the human desire to show one's best qualities, to achieve the highest results in one or another sphere of activity and surpass the accomplishments of others. But this does not tolerate falseness, indifference or formalism.

We also eliminate from troop practices a simplified approach to analyzing the effectiveness of the competition. In some places, this comes down to counting the number of outstanding men and laggards who fulfilled and did not fulfill the points of the obligations. Of course, statistical reporting is essential, but behind it should stand a detailed analysis of the entire situation, the moral atmosphere in the collectives and the effectiveness of the competition on the awareness of various categories of servicemen. Such analysis will make it possible to seek out the most effective forms of party political work in the area of strengthening and developing healthy and highly moral relations in the collectives of the subunits and units. Counting solely on the quantitative indicators, on a good report or a resounding figure can distort reality, over time it gives rise to indifference and tells negatively on the moral indoctrination of the men.

In speaking about a further rise in the indoctrinational role of the socialist competition, we would particularly like to emphasize that here a great deal depends upon the political bodies and party organizations and their principled fight against formalism, inobjectivity and eyewash. The USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov in his report at the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries pointed to the need to strengthen communist influence on all aspects of the life and activities of the troop collectives and to constantly increase the effectiveness of the competition for high end results in military and political training and indoctrination of the personnel. In carrying out the recommendations of the conference, many political bodies and party organizations have significantly intensified their work in developing the creative initiative of the men and their desire to achieve more in military, political and moral improvement.

They have begun to show more concern for fostering in the commanders and all the communists a view of the competition as a vital process which does not tolerate routine and red tape and which does not mechanically influence the results of training and military discipline, but rather through the awareness and feelings of the men. The commanders and political workers, the communists and Komsomol activists in the indoctrinational work with the men focus their attention on the unsolved problems and on the specific goals which they must fight for today, tomorrow, in a week or month. They endeavor to make the experience of the pacesetters in the competition a moral guideline for all and to bring the laggards up to the level of the right flankers.

Precisely such a style of work is inherent to the party organization in the twice order-bearing motorized rifle regiment where Lt Col A. Gerasimov is the commander. This regiment in the group of forces has initiated a socialist competition under the motto "Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" The communists, in helping the commander achieve an effective competition and a strengthening of its indoctrinational role, have interjected a spirit of professionalism, principledness and implacability for shortcomings in solving all questions. By their personal example in service, in observing proper order and in carrying out socialist obligations, by the strength of ideological conviction and by their party word they mobilize all the men to successfully carry out the tasks of the summer training period and properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

After the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the activists began more tenaciously to seek out their ways of approach, their forms and methods of political influence on increasing the mobilizing and indoctrinational role of the competition. In involving a broad range of communists and Komsomol members in the work, they have created a situation of emotional excitement at the personnel meetings where obligations have been set for the periods of field exercises and tactical training for they sum up the results of their fulfillment and endeavor to "touch the men to the quick." For example, a soldier, squad or platoon gives its word to hit the target with the first round at maximum range and the activists extol them in the eyes of their comrades as men of high duty.

Or take the following question. In all the units the winners of the competition are given commendations. The commendations are read, certificates and challenge pennants are presented and express leaflets, battle leaflets and radio broadcasts are devoted to them. But in some collectives this is done late and in an overly officious manner while in others, as they say, hot on the trail of events, in a solemn situation, not sparing good words and touching the "strings" of the soul. The political bodies and party organizations, in dealing sharply with those who forget the indoctrinational aspect of the competition and in every possible way supporting the thinking and searching communist leaders and in disseminating their experience, see to it that the moral incentives are rationally utilized everywhere.

There is a tangible effect also from the colloquiums conducted upon the initiative of the party organizations for the officers, warrant officers and sergeants on the work of V. I. Lenin "How to Organize the Competition?" and the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee, exchange-of-opinion evenings and talks to the young soldiers by the best specialists and by the disciplined men who are examples in everything.

The commanders, political bodies and party organizations of the Southern Group of Forces see in strengthening the effect of party political work on the forming of a highly moral personality of the armed defender of the socialist fatherland a way to successfully carry out the tasks posed for the Armed Forces by the 26th Congress of the Leninist party and to carry out the demands of the USSR minister of defense. Among the indoctrinational means, an important place is held by the socialist competition which is an arena for the most vivid manifesting of patriotism and the best moral-political qualities of a serviceman. Ably organized, lively and creative, it helps create in the troop units a situation of dissatisfaction with the achieved level, a desire to attain high goals and impels each man to be vitally concerned for the combat readiness of the unit and subunit and to make his contribution to preparing to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

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## ARMED FORCES

### ROLE OF POLITICAL TRAINING INSTRUCTORS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 82 (signed to press 18 Jun 82) pp 9-14

[Unattributed article "The Political Exercise Group Leader"]

[Text] Each day of combat training means intense work by the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], sergeants and petty officers, soldiers and sailors. It means a marked step ahead in raising the combat readiness of the troops, in improving the skill of the servicemen in servicing and using the modern equipment and in working out teamwork in the actions of the squads, teams and crews. Having joined the socialist competition under the motto "Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" the personnel of the units and subunits are achieving high results in carrying out the tasks confronting them and are demonstrating purposefulness in the struggle to carry out the assigned obligations.

What is the source of enthusiasm and inspiration for the men and their zeal in military service? First of all, in communist ideological loyalty which has been and remains the inexorable foundation for the high moral-combat qualities of the Soviet officer, warrant officer, sergeant and petty officer, soldier and sailors. A truly effective and stable resolving of the constantly more complex questions of combat readiness, emphasized the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU, Comrade D. F. Ustinov, at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, can be ensured only on the basis of constantly increasing the political training of the men and their awareness. For this reason, the commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations pay primary significance to the ideological indoctrination of the men. They proceed from the party's instructions and the demands of its 26th Congress to in every possible way work for a high level of ideological and political indoctrination activities so that their content become more timely and the forms meet the present needs and demands of the Soviet people.

The leaders of political exercise groups play a major role in the ideological indoctrination of the men. This is understandable. Political exercises are one of the basic and effective forms for indoctrinating the servicemen as ideologically convinced and aware defenders of the motherland. Here they study Lenin's ideological and theoretical heritage, the urgent problems of party theory and policy, the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress and the works and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev; they become profoundly aware of the

requirements of the military oath and regulations. Political exercises help to develop in the men a communist ideology, and develop an activist position in life. They help them more profoundly understand their place in the formation of the creators and defenders of a new society and to more clearly understand the sense and significance of the tasks posed for them by the party and government. On what level political studies are organized determines their effectiveness, actuality and impact on the sergeants and petty officers, the soldiers and sailors. This level, as is known, is determined by many factors and primarily by the high theoretical knowledge, methodological skills and pedagogical experience of the political exercise group leader.

In commenting on the special role played by the propagandist in the system of party studies, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress said: "Precisely he largely determines what the seminars, political schools and universities will be: whether they will be a place where boredom reigns, where the stipulated hours are merely 'served out' or whether, on the contrary, everywhere they become real centers of living party ideas and words. The attitude of people toward party studies depends primarily upon the ideological and propaganda party aktiv. People should gravitate to them by themselves in order to collectively discuss the urgent problems of party theory and practice and gain answers to the questions which concern everyone and add to their ideological and theoretical knowledge." These words, of course, apply fully to the Armed Forces propagandists as well, including those who conduct political exercises with the personnel.

A large detachment of volunteer propagandists who lead the political exercise groups is at work in the Army and Navy. Life convincingly shows that a majority of them conscientiously carry out their difficult duties, show great responsibility to the assigned job and possess profound theoretical knowledge and pedagogical skills. They are well aware that their primary duty is to constantly and with all tenaciousness work for a high ideological and organizational level of political exercises and to spare neither forces nor effort for this. They are obliged to do this by the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress and the Decree of the Party Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination."

Among the young propagandists who devote all their knowledge, experience and ardor to the assigned job one might mention Lt A. Oleynikov. The political exercise group which he leads is considered one of the best in the unit.

What determines this officer's success? First of all, his high personal responsibility for the assigned job, strict exactingness for the preparation of each lecture, narration, talk and seminar and a constant desire to utilize every opportunity for improving the political exercises and raising their impact on the students in carrying out practical tasks.

The young propagandist thoroughly studies the required and additional literature and actively utilizes the facts and examples from various TV broadcasts, artistic works, the recommendations received in courses and instructional sessions for the group leaders as well as the experience of other comrades. A characteristic feature in the officer's work is close attention to each student. To talk a bit how he has prepared for the exercise, on what he has focused his attention,



to show an interest in what works have been outlined and how, how the soldier understands one or another question, where he is experiencing difficulties and to make recommendations and advice--this is the rule which is unswervingly followed by the propagandist. Nor does he overlook those who for some reason have not been able to attend the exercise. The officer also sees it as his duty to additionally explain the subject to them, to help in correctly organizing preparations, to recommend how to better master the material and to more closely link it with the life of the collective and the tasks being carried out by the men.

The assistant group leaders have always been and remain a dependable support for the propagandist in organizing the political studies of the men. Practice shows that they more successfully carry out their duties if seminars are held regularly for them and if constant concern is shown for their theoretical growth and instilling in them the skills of working with the students. Considering this, Lt Oleynikov maintains constant contact with his assistant, he passes on his experience and sees to it that the latter carries out his duties knowledgeably and with a high sense of responsibility.

Unfortunately, not all the group leaders as yet successfully handle the duties entrusted to them or show proper endeavor and tenacity in broadening their knowledge, educational skills or experience in preparing and giving lectures or holding seminars and talks. Some of them are unable to give the material clearly and convincingly, in a style of a lively narration, to closely link theoretical concepts with the practical tasks of the men, to draw generalizations and conclusions and organize an active exchange of opinions in the group. This happens primarily because the propagandists themselves do not show a high sense of responsibility for the assigned job, they are not always sufficiently prepared on the theoretical and procedural level and do not fully utilize all those broad opportunities which they are given for improving their knowledge and skills.

The struggle for a high ideological and organizational level in the political exercises is a very important task. To successfully carry it out means to achieve a further strengthening of the ideological indoctrination of the men and a greater influence of political studies on carrying out the tasks posed for the troops. First of all, we must decisively get rid of formalism in the preparation and conducting of the exercises and seminars, regardless of in what form it is manifested, we must significantly improve their ideological and organizational level and see to it that each student creatively masters Lenin's ideological and theoretical heritage and is profoundly aware of the importance of Lenin's ideas for the building of a communist society and for defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. Political studies must ensure a profound assimilation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and on this basis a mobilizing of the personnel to carry them out.

Particular attention should be given to demonstrating the practical measures being undertaken by the party Central Committee for fulfilling the decisions adopted by the congress and that truly gigantic work related to the constant implementation of the economic and sociopolitical measures and foreign policy tasks. Millions of Soviet workers are involved in this work. It is important to demonstrate to the men the entire greatness of the party's creative activities and its concern for raising the material and cultural standard of living of

our people and to make each serviceman profoundly aware of the importance of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the report by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "On the USSR Food Program for the Period Up to 1990 and the Measures to Implement It." This is a major contribution to scientific communism, to the Marxist-Leninist theory of the agrarian question and to the practice of solving the food problem.

In the process of political exercises, we must actively bring out the course of preparations for celebrating the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and explain the Leninist nationality policy and the successes of its realization in the USSR, the significance of friendship of peoples as a source in the might of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces and of the achievements of the fraternal Soviet republics in communist construction and in economic and cultural development.

As before, a major place in the political exercises should be devoted to the questions of military indoctrination. It is important that in studying each section of the curriculum, the students deepen their knowledge of Lenin's legacy to the Soviet military and the demands placed upon them by the party under present-day conditions. Using convincing, specific examples it is essential to unmask the aggressive essence of imperialism, particularly American and explain the acuteness of the present-day international situation and the tasks confronting the personnel.

Naturally, all of this poses a number of difficult problems for the leaders of political exercise groups and obliges them to increase their personal responsibility for the assigned job, to constantly improve their theoretical knowledge, to thoroughly study the original sources and be concerned with increasing their educational skills. This is an indispensable condition for the successful achieving of the goal.

Experience convincingly shows that one of the basic forms for the all-round training of a propagandist is independent work. This brings good results if it is organized systematically, according to a well-thought-out plan and considering the specific conditions. Here everything is important: the correct distribution of time, the careful determining of questions on which basic attention should be focused, the choice of the required literature, the ability to make the appropriate notes, to thoroughly know the situation in the subunit and the tasks which the students must carry out. Also, of great importance is the ability to fully utilize educational studies and aids in independent preparation. These are found in the reference information centers at the officer and unit clubs; the help of libraries and the experience of leading propagandists must also be sought. It is also essential to have a good knowledge of the capabilities of the propaganda equipment and be able to handle the equipment and use it skillfully.

The effectiveness of the propagandists' independent preparations increases immeasurably if daily concern is shown by the commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations for increasing the level of the servicemen's political studies. This means primarily strict control over the preparation of the leaders of the political exercise groups, specific aid in organizing it and the providing of the necessary time for this work. Of great benefit are personal talks by the commanders and their deputies for political affairs with the young

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propagandists on how to better organize independent preparation. Also widely practiced is the giving of reports by the communist leaders of political exercise groups at party committee and bureau sessions. This is a good form for helping the propagandists. It makes it possible not only to supervise their activities, but also outline practical measures aimed at improving the level of political preparation as well as generalize and disseminate advanced experience.

The seminars conducted in the units and on the ships are a real school for the propagandists. Here the theoretical knowledge and educational skills of the group leader are improved and his readiness for the exercise is increased. It is important in every possible way to improve the content of the seminars, to include in their program without fail the questions of studying advanced experience and improving the methods for conducting the lectures and talks and to systematically and effectively inform the propagandists on the questions of the domestic and international life of the nation, the combat and political training of the troops and naval forces. The seminars must not be permitted to be hurriedly prepared or conducted according to a reduced program or unsystematically. In turn, the reader of the political exercise group should arrive at the seminar prepared, with a clear notion of what questions he wants answered and more actively adopt advice, recommendations and advanced experience.

It has become a practice to have the representatives of the political departments and other political workers be present at the lectures, talks and seminars conducted by young propagandists (they comprise a majority among the leaders of the political exercise groups). Such visits bring great benefit if the experienced comrades do not limit themselves to superficial comments directed at the propagandists or to the listing of shortcomings but rather provide a profound, thoughtful and specific analysis of the methods of giving the lecture, organizing the talk and seminar and if they hold a thorough discussion with the young officers on what should and can be done to improve their work as group leaders.

Unfortunately, instances are still frequently encountered when the propagandist of a regiment or ship, in visiting a political exercise, reduces his comments to recording various particular shortcomings but does not pay attention to major oversights in the content and procedure of the exercises. Sometimes, the representatives of the political department, after attending lectures or seminars, do not organize a profound analysis of them and instead of specific and concrete recommendations limit themselves to unimportant comments. The inability to see errors, to disclose and eliminate their causes, to generalize and disseminate the positive and to draw practical conclusions is a serious impediment on the path to increasing the effectiveness of work related to training the propagandists. This must be taken into account.

Among the well-proven forms of work related to instilling the necessary skill and procedural habits in a young propagandist, one must mention his systematic and thorough familiarization with the great experience of the leading leaders of political exercise groups. In attending their lectures and seminars, the propagandists become acquainted with how preparations for speeches are made, what literature is employed, how facts and examples from military life are selected and grouped and how the activeness of the students is achieved.

However, such exercises are not always organized in an instructive manner everywhere. There have been frequent instances when lectures at them have been given by group leaders not sufficiently prepared in educational terms and not possessing propagandist skill. Naturally, the attending of such a lecture does little to enrich the young propagandist and causes a feeling of dissatisfaction in him.

The task is to carefully prepare for the open lessons and achieve their high ideological and organizational level. They should truly be an example in all regards, they should teach the young propagandists and inspire them to enterprising, creative and highly effective work.

Practice shows that in the development of the leaders of political exercise groups and in improving theoretical knowledge and educational skills, a major role is played by their regular meeting, at least once a month, with the leadership of the formations and units. At such meetings the propagandists gain profound and complete information about the state of combat training and discipline and become acquainted with the tasks which the personnel must carry out.

The Army and Navy press can and should provide significant aid to the political studies leaders. The task of the press is to more fully satisfy the needs of the propagandists, to systematically publish special articles, excerpts, diagrams and numerical data on the subjects of political exercises and take up the experience of the leading group leaders. However, it must be pointed out that all this material can be useless if the propagandists themselves do not pay proper attention to it, if they do not thoroughly study it, actively employ it in preparing the lectures and talks and creatively analyze each fact and example.

Initiative, endeavor and creativity on the part of a propagandist are the most dependable path for the growth of his skill. There are very broad opportunities for him to gain knowledge, broaden his viewpoint and acquire practical skills under army conditions. It is important to utilize them fully, to earnestly and carefully select all that is valuable and necessary for himself, to be able to acquire material and systematize it. For example, let us take the cultural and educational institutions. They do a great deal to help the propagandists become enriched in advanced experience in organizing exercises and to arm them with modern methods for giving lectures and holding seminars. Special-subject meetings, meetings with prominent persons, film festivals, trips to plants and factories, the discussion of books and films and book exhibits are organized in the aim of broadening their viewpoint. All of this must be employed as actively as possible. The propagandist who refuses the measures conducted by the cultural and educational institutions and does not take an active part in them deprives himself of an opportunity to be enriched with new knowledge needed for the political indoctrination of the men.

The duties of a leader of a political exercise group are not easy and require from him not only knowledge and experience but also great spiritual force, total dedication, initiative and creativity. In order to convince others, it is essential for oneself to be profoundly convinced and in order to inspire one's students one must be inspired himself. These are old truths. They remind us that formalism is alien to a propagandist's work and indifference and complacency are organically contraindicated. The propagandist does not have the right to be content with what has been achieved or to fall behind in his creative advancement. He must be constantly on the search for new, evermore effective ways

for an ideological influence on the men. Day in and day out he must improve his skill and grow ideologically, spiritually and professionally.

A healthy dissatisfaction with one's successes, a constant desire to adopt the Leninist art of propaganda and agitation and to embody in practice the party's instructions on increasing the effectiveness of all ideological and political indoctrination--this is what should distinguish the Army and Navy propagandists. Inherent to them should be a feeling of high responsibility for the content and results of indoctrinational work as well as a creative search for new forms and methods of working with people. Precisely high responsibility on the part of each group leader for the political indoctrination of the personnel and for developing in the men the remarkable spiritual qualities essential to a defender of the socialist motherland has been and remains a dependable guarantee for success. To be up to the level of the demands of our party on the ideological workers means to devote all one's forces, knowledge and experience to the struggle to raise the awareness of the servicemen and to aid in every possible way in increasing their activeness in carrying out the tasks confronting the troops and ships. It means total dedication to successfully carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

For the propagandists, including the leaders of political exercise groups, there is no higher duty than by all their activity aimed at further improving the ideological indoctrination of the men to contribute to the greatest possible rise in the patriotic upsurge of the personnel and to aim them at achieving the highest indicators in military and political training and in the struggle for a high level of combat readiness among the units and ships.

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## ARMED FORCES

### ROLE OF PARTY SECRETARIES IN CORRECTING SHORTCOMINGS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 82 (signed to press 18 Jun 82) pp 32-37

[Article by Maj V. Tryakin, party committee secretary of a motorized rifle regiment and participant in the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries: "Implacability for Shortcomings"]

[Text] [Editors' Note] Having noted the major role played by the primary party organizations in carrying out the plans for communist construction, the 26th CPSU Congress set an important practical task of raising their initiative and principledness in every possible way. These traits of a Leninist style of party work were at the center of attention at the recently held Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. It pointed out that the main area in which the activity, initiative and principledness should be manifested is a concern for raising the combat readiness of the formations, units and ships. Here the range of questions is large. This means primarily the ability to constantly and consistently carry out party policy in the Armed Forces, to knowledgeably delve into the combat training and service of the personnel in the units, subunits and ships, to strengthen military discipline in every possible way and to improve the forms and methods of indoctrinational and organizational work. This also means a desire to assess the state of affairs from a viewpoint of common state interests, to indoctrinate in the communists an activist position in life, responsibility for carrying out service and party duty and a healthy dissatisfaction with what has been achieved; it means developing a feeling for the new.

The editors invite the commanders, the political workers and the party organization secretaries, that is, all communists, to share on the journal's pages their reflections on how to better and more fully carry out the demands placed by the party and its 26th Congress on the party organizations, in what manner to carry out the recommendations of the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, how to see to it that all the party collectives act energetically, with initiative and principles, that they in fact be the political nucleus of the military collective, a true center of daily ideological indoctrinational activities and

have an unflagging influence on raising the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

Below, we publish the first article [End of editorial comment.]

I write these lines immediately after the party meeting held in one of our unit's subunits. The communists were discussing the results of the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries and the tasks stemming from the greetings of the CPSU Central Committee to the conference participants and from the ideas and conclusions contained in the reports of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The communists spoke actively and maturely. But it was alarming that some of them paid great tribute to the successes of others.

Understandably, no one intends to play down the successes of the collective and the work of people must always be properly assessed. However, we must not be flattered by the achieved, become self-complacent or overoptimistic. Certainly each goal won in the struggle to improve the combat readiness of a subunit or unit is only the next step which must start the ascent to a new height. Here the party organization has a great role to play. It is important that it, as was pointed out at the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, indoctrinate in the men a dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, show principledness, see the unfinished business, disclose shortcomings and take measures aimed at eliminating this. I spoke about this in my talk at the meeting. I reminded the subunit's communists about the facts of poor quality exercises and instances of violations of military discipline.

After the meeting, the subunit's party organization secretary, it seemed to me, with surprise and injury in his voice said: "You criticized us. Do we merit this? We are considered pacesetters...."

I thought involuntarily: No, not in all the party organizations has an atmosphere of exactingness been created or a critical approach developed in assessing one's own labor and the labor of comrades. We have not seen to it that all the party members and candidate members be keenly aware of their responsibility for the cause of the collective and work actively against shortcomings. We have communists who endeavor to conceal themselves behind successes, literally like a shield, against any sort of criticism addressed at them and to see in these successes a sort of immunity from criticism. They do not draw attention to certain "details" or insignificant omissions which supposedly cannot alter the overall picture.

The halting on the path to the heights of combat skill, self-complacency and a reticence to see shortcomings, to analyze their causes and then correct things--all of this leads to a situation where ultimately the collective abandons its positions held. Here is the proof.

Not so long ago the battalion under the command of Maj P. Krasnov was an outstanding one. The men successfully carried out the tasks confronting them. Where was the training and indoctrinational process best organized? Everyone knew: in Krasnov's battalion. Where was military discipline on the proper level and where had proper order been established? Again, under Krasnov. The

battalion was praised and used as an example. But then, it seems, this turned the heads of some. The men felt that we have achieved everything, we can let up on the pace and relax somewhat. Individual communists did not prepare with the previous care for the exercises and drills and lowered the demands made on themselves. They began to overlook facts of weaknesses and simplification in training and shortcomings in the mastery of military equipment and weapons as well as individual infractions. For example, the CPSU members Sr Lt I. Kodinets and WO ["praporshchik"] L. Krapiva frequently violated discipline, however the communists closed their eyes to this. As before, it was felt that everything was going smoothly in the battalion. However, here a decline in combat and political training was occurring and this made itself felt at the finish of the half year as the battalion did not carry out its socialist obligations.

Of course, the party committee was largely to blame for what had happened and we, the party committee members, did not promptly check the subunit's party organization and did not focus the battalion's communists on actively fighting the shortcomings. We intervened, but it was already too late. The battalion, as they say, was shifted from the right flank to the left.

At present, in the course of summer training, we are making every effort to return the lost glory to the subunit and bring it again among the excellent. Things have noticeably improved. The battalion communists also realized that there would have not been a decline if they had dealt strictly with themselves and others.

To show impatience with shortcomings, with one's own omissions and problems in work is a demand of the Leninist party and its 26th Congress. This idea was voiced in the concluding speech of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov at the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. He pointed out that an indispensable condition for success in party work is implacability for any weaknesses whatsoever and the active elimination of existing shortcomings.

Our party organization strengthened the attention paid to indoctrinating the communists in a spirit of implacability toward shortcomings and various weaknesses in service and training. At the party meetings and sessions of the party committee and bureau, the questions were brought up of increasing responsibility and principledness of the CPSU members and candidate members and of developing their activeness and initiative. The communists will endeavor to profoundly analyze the state of affairs in one or another area of combat training. The discussion, as a rule, is sharp and self-critical and business-like decisions are adopted which are then carried out.

Precisely a unity of word and deed, decision and execution helped us bring the unit up among the leaders and achieve success in the "Zapad-81" [West-81] Exercises. The men acted at full force and demonstrated good skills. In the winter training period, definite successes were also achieved. In the socialist competition which developed under the motto "Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" a majority of the unit's subunits completely carried out the assumed obligations. Here, I repeat, the communists were largely responsible.



However, we cannot help but be concerned by certain facts. At one of the party committee sessions, we were analyzing how the subunit party organizations were ensuring the vanguard role of the party members and candidate members. What did we find out? In the subunits under the command of officers V. Ivashchenko, V. Mikhal'chik and L. Zharov, more than 80 percent of the communists had demonstrated excellent results in training and served as an example of carrying out their service and party duties. But in certain subunits this indicator is much lower. For example, in the battalion where V. Sokol serves, only one out of every two communists is an outstanding man in combat and political training. The question arises of why aren't the other members of the party organization in the vanguard of the competitors?

Or the following question. Certain communists from this battalion during the winter training period had disciplinary reprimands. Individual comrades also had severe party reprimands. Of course, this to a significant degree weakens the force of party influence on the men. In this regard I recall the words of the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, from his report at the All-Army Conference that the party organizations are obliged to show constant concern for raising the vanguard role of each party members and candidate member. Ensuring the vanguard role of the communists is, as was emphasized, the key to strengthening party influence on carrying out the tasks of troop and fleet training.

This was clearly and decisively stated. In actuality, how can a communist challenge others to achieve high results in combat training and service, to strictly observe the requirements of the military regulations and fight against shortcomings if he himself does not set the example in this? Will people pay attention to his words? A personal example set by the communists in everything is truly a dependable key to strengthening party influence on all aspects of the military collective's life. Let me give a specific example.

I have already mentioned above that in the subunit under the command of Officer V. Mikhal'chik, a predominant majority of the party members and candidate members perform their service and party duties in an exemplary manner. This gives them an opportunity to effectively influence the men, to mobilize them to carry out the pending tasks and to fight against shortcomings. The authority of the subunit's communists is high, their word is weighty and their actions effective. I have repeatedly been present in this party organization, and in particular, at meetings. No matter what problems were being discussed here, always at the center of their attention was: had the party organization done everything to ensure the vanguard role of the communists in training and service? Criticism was directed against the comrades in whom a letdown in work was observed and measures were adopted aimed at eliminating the shortcomings. I recall that at one of the meetings, a report was heard by the CPSU member, Capt V. Drobyshevskiy on his contribution to improving the quality of weapons training among his subordinates. The problem was that the men of the subunit commanded by this officer had reduced their indicators in weapons training. In exercises with field firing they did not act the best, although prior to this they had always shown high results.

The secretary of the subunit party organization who was assigned to investigate what had happened discovered that the blame for all of this was to be found in

the complacency and indifference of Drobyshevskiy himself. He had reduced the demands on himself, he had ceased to increase his professional training and allowed weaknesses in subordinates. Such an attitude toward the job had been passed on to other officers and sergeants in the subunit and this ultimately led to a decline in the level of the men's weapons training.

In the course of listening to Drobyshevskiy's report, the communists pointed out to the officer his oversights in work and demanded that he not stop at the achieved level, but constantly improve his professional skills and be an example for subordinates in carrying out military duty and in showing a principled attitude toward flaws in training and service. The communists also gave Drobyshevskiy a number of recommendations. For example, they advised the officer to more attentively watch how one of the best battery commanders, Sr Lt A. Vankevich, trained his subordinates. In the work of this communist officer there is much that is instructive. In constantly improving his own professional training and in working in close contact with the subunit Komsomol organization, he has been able to achieve a high level of weapons training among the battery personnel.

Subsequently, the party organization supervised how Drobyshevskiy carried out its recommendations and provided him with specific aid. Time showed that the demanding talk at the party meeting had been beneficial. The officer increased the demands made on himself and altered his attitude toward the job. And the result was that the weapons training of the subunit personnel improved.

I would point out that the hearing of a report was instructive not only for Drobyshevskiy but also for the other communists. It helped to increase their sense of responsibility for carrying out service and party duty.

But there are also instances of a different sort. Frequently, at various conferences and meetings one can hear reproaches addressed to the motorized rifle troops in the subunit where Maj M. Shvidkiy serves. The reproaches are valid. The battalion had started, as they say, to mark time. The final exercise for the winter training period showed that there were flaws in the skills of the subunit's personnel as the gunners did not fire confidently and certain drivers showed poor skills. The tactical training of individual platoon and squad commanders could also have been higher.

Such a situation was explained by a number of factors. Primarily by the fact that the subunit party organization did not have a sufficiently effective influence on the collective's life. Not all the party members and candidate members in the battalion set an example of carrying out military and party duty. And the party organization tolerated this.

I well recall, for example, the report-election party meeting in the battalion. Few of the communists spoke boldly and decisively about the shortcomings and missed opportunities. Virtually all the speakers briefly mentioned the problems without endeavoring to go into their causes. The comrades mainly listed the successes and called for a "improvement" or "rise"....

The following fact is noteworthy. At the meeting, the CPSU members, WO I. Babuk, the company's senior technician, asked to speak. This communist had merited

criticism both for poor professional training and for deviations from the requirements of the military regulations. At that time, I thought that Babuk probably intended to assess self-critically his contribution to the battalion's combat readiness. He began to speak. But what did he say? He spoke "generally and at length" about the shortcomings in the work of the party organization, but was silent about his own oversights.

It cannot be said that the battalion's communists at their meetings did not bring up the question of the vanguard role of the party members and candidate members or raising their responsibility, principledness and activity. Such problems were taken up. But the issue is not merely the posing of questions, as was pointed out at the All-Army Conference, but rather that the party organization thoroughly analyzed them, find its way to approach a solving of the various problems and work out the procedures and methods for a party influence on eliminating the shortcomings. For example, the battalion's communists repeatedly discussed the question of improving the quality of officer commander training. Good decisions were adopted. However, the question, it can be said, did not go any farther. Here is a fact. A total of 40 percent of the officers in the battalion have an increased class proficiency. Certainly a high class proficiency is an indicator of skill. But this is lacking in certain company and platoon commanders in this subunit and this certainly cannot help but tell upon the quality of combat training for the battalion's personnel.

We feel that everything can be explained by the fact that in the party organization there is not a real party demand on the communists. Here at times they indifferently pass over flaws in the work of the party members and candidate members. And if someone is punished, this is done, as they say, by a mere slap on the fingers.

Recently, a party reprimand was made against the CPSU member, WO I. Babuk. He had repeatedly violated the requirements of the party and military regulations. I emphasize; repeatedly. Of course, his misdeeds did not go unnoticed. He was rebuked, but usually just admonished. Babuk, not feeling a strict attitude from him comrades, continued to violate discipline. Only after he had committed a flagrant misdeed, did the communists reprimand him and enter this in his service card.

The party committee approved the given decision. But here also it pointed out to the subunit party organization the low demands made upon the party members and candidate members and the insufficient indoctrinational work with them. We suggested to the comrades that the party organization made little use of such a means of increasing the responsibility of the communists and indoctrinating demandingness, implacability for complacency and shortcomings as hearing reports by the party members and candidate members on their carrying out of service and party duties. For example, the same Babuk had not been invited to the party bureau, they had not shown any interest in what difficulties he had encountered or what help he needed, they had not reminded him of the duties of a party member or demanded: Be good, comrade, carry out the CPSU By-laws as you should and do not defame your authority or the collective's authority.

True intolerance of shortcomings, as is known, is manifested in preventing a misdeed by one or another communist. It is essential to spot the shortcoming

in the bud, not allow it to develop and grow. Here both friendly criticism, good advice and comradely aid are particularly important. Precisely they help to create in the collective an atmosphere of exactingness and demandingness on one another and to strengthen the party's influence on eliminating shortcomings.

One other thing I would like to mention. A situation of mutual exactingness in a party collective and intolerance of shortcomings depends largely upon the party organization secretary. For this reason we, the party committee members, constantly emphasize at secretary seminars and when we are in the party organizations that the leader of the communists must possess high political, professional and organizational qualities and be up to the demands of the party. Inherent to him should be such qualities as implacability for shortcomings and activeness in combating them. It must be admitted that comrades are encountered who have good ideological and theoretical training, their organizational skills are not bad but they lack principledness and boldness in posing acute questions.

I recall one time the command and party committee of a unit was concerned by the state of military discipline in the company under the command of Sr Lt E. Apoyan. Certain sergeants and soldiers had violated the requirements of the regulations. There had been instances when the servicemen from this subunit insulted each other. The collective lacked that spirit of friendship and military comradeship which unites the personnel.

When an investigation was made, it turned out that the company's officers, including the commander, were little concerned with indoctrinating their subordinates. Here they had forgotten an individual approach to the men and emphasized sheer bureaucratic procedures. Sometimes the company commander himself broke into shouting and was frankly coarse.

All of this was seen by the deputy commander for political affairs, Lt V. Malykhin and he was also the party organization secretary. He saw this, but did not undertake effective measures to rectify the situation. Moreover, he sometimes endeavored to conceal shortcomings. Several times I spoke with him and only heard assurances that in our unit everything was going well. The man did not want to foul the nest. We, of course, reprimanded both the secretary and the other communists in the company. What had happened was discussed at the next seminar of party organization secretaries. There was a thorough discussion of the authority of the party secretary and of his role in creating a situation of mutual exactingness in the collective and instilling in the communists high party qualities and a Leninist style of work. The deputy regimental commander for political affairs and the party committee members held a colloquium with the party organization secretaries on the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress. At present, the questions of the training and indoctrination of the aktiv are at the center of attention of the party committee. For example, we recently held a colloquium with the party activists on the materials of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Decree of the Party Central Committee on the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR and the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. We are focusing our efforts on indoctrinating the activists and teaching them practical work on the spot. These guidelines have been given by the All-Army Conference. They

are dependable and true guidelines. A profound study of the personnel and the situation in the subunits, the daily indoctrination of the aktiv and rank-and-file communists, constant concern for their vanguard role and the developing of an atmosphere of high reciprocal exactingness in the collectives--this largely will determine the success in the fight against shortcomings and will help to strengthen party influence on carrying out the tasks of military and political training.

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## ARMED FORCES

### OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON PARTY LEADERSHIP OF ARMED FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 82 (signed to press 18 Jun 82) pp 56-62

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent, Capt 1st Rank A. Plekhov: "CPSU Leadership--The Main Source of Might in the Soviet Armed Forces"]

[Text] A study of the given subject will help the student more profoundly understand the importance of Communist Party leadership over the USSR Armed Forces and the increasing role of the CPSU in organizing the defense of socialism and in determining the prospects of Soviet military organizational development under present-day conditions. The exercise should focus the men on the exemplary fulfillment of patriotic duty to the party and people, at a continuous rise in vigilance and combat readiness, the mastery of combat specialties, the able and effective use of combat equipment and weapons and the strengthening of discipline and organization in the subunits, units and ships.

Ten hours are allocated for studying the subject. This time should be used in the following manner: 2 hours allocated for a lecture (narration), 4 hours for the independent preparation of the students and 4 hours for a seminar (talk).

In the lecture (narration), it is recommended that the following questions be taken up: 1. The leadership of the Communist Party over the Armed Forces--a major principle in Soviet military organizational development. 2. The increased role of the CPSU in the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces under present-day conditions.

In a brief introduction it must be emphasized that the Leninist wisdom of our party is embodied in all the accomplishments of the Soviet people who are steadily creating a communist society. The CPSU is the tested vanguard of the working class and the entire multinational Soviet people, the inspirer and organizer of their outstanding accomplishments. Under its leadership have been created the powerful USSR (the 60th anniversary of the formation of which we will celebrate in the present year) and the valorous Armed Forces. Over the entire heroic history of our army and navy, the party has led them from victory to victory. The fact that they now represent a first-rate military organization of our times capable of defending the victories of socialism against any aggressors is the greatest accomplishment of the CPSU.

1. The Leadership of the Communist Party over the Armed Forces--A Major Principle in Soviet Military Organizational Development

All the activities of our party and the Soviet people are aimed at carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, at further strengthening the mature socialist society, creating the material and technical base of communism, forming communist social relationships and indoctrinating a harmoniously developed individual. A new manifestation of the concern of the CPSU for the welfare of the people was the May (1982) Plenum of the Party Central Committee. The plenum approved the USSR Food Program for the period up to 1990 and outlined the measures to implement it. The carrying out of this program will raise the supply of food resources for the Soviet nation to a new, higher level and will contribute to further progress in the entire national economy.

In carrying out the new creative tasks and in improving the development of the socialist society, we at the same time cannot forget the secure defense of our revolutionary victories against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism. "In order that our creative plans be implemented," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the plenum, "we need the preservation of peace. For this reason we will maintain national defense capability on the proper level and we will steadily and purposefully continue the struggle for a lessening of international tension, both political and military tension."

The party has steadily carried out the legacy of the great Lenin that our steps toward peace should be accompanied by a rise in our combat readiness. Historical experience has taught us this. Having scarcely come into existence, the young Soviet state was immediately subjected to an imperialist invasion involving 14 capitalist states which set for themselves the evil goal of drowning the people who had overthrown the exploiters in blood. After the foreign invaders had been defeated along with the internal counterrevolution, the imperialists did not abandon their plan to destroy the new social system by armed force. For this reason, the struggle for peace and the concern for strengthening national defense capability and further improving the Soviet Armed Forces was in the past and is at present a matter of primary importance for the Leninist party. For this reason the party and state at no time overlook the questions of strengthening the defense might of the nation and its Armed Forces.

The leadership of the Communist Party over the question of the defense of socialism, military organizational development, the development and improving of the Soviet Armed Forces is determined by the place and role of the party in the political system of socialism. As the highest form of a sociopolitical organization and as the guiding force of Soviet society, the CPSU directs the activities of the masses of people at carrying out the tasks of communist construction. Its leadership encompasses such a major sphere of life in a socialist society as national defense against the aggressive intrigues of the imperialists and their supporters. Only a communist party which in all its diverse activities is led by the solely correct revolutionary teaching, Marxism-Leninism, is capable of correctly resolving the entire involved group of problems related to the defense of the socialist fatherland and to the theory and practice of military affairs. Communist Party leadership over the military organizational development and the Armed Forces is the main source of their might and the decisive condition for the successful development of the socialist military organization.

V. I. Lenin devoted great attention to establishing the leading role of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces. He worked out the fundamental theoretical provisions on the significance, essence and content of party leadership over the Army and Navy. Upon the initiative of V. I. Lenin, for the first time these were stated in the Decree of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee "On the Policy of the Military Department" of 25 December 1918. This important party document emphasized that the policy of the military department, like all other departments and institutions, is conducted on the precise basis of the overall directives issued by the party in the person of its Central Committee and under its direct control.

The notion of the party's leading role in Soviet military organizational development and in the development and strengthening of the USSR Armed Forces has also been embodied in the decisions of the party congresses, plenums and conferences and in the decrees of the Central Committee. After the Great October Socialist Revolution there was not a single congress which did not discuss the questions of party leadership over military organizational development.

The decisions of the Eighth RKP(b) Congress were of particular significance for creating the Armed Forces of the young Soviet state. The Party Program adopted by the congress and a special resolution contained major provisions on the organizational development of the Red Army as a regular, centralized military organization and they emphasized its party leadership. Exceptional attention was paid to the development of party political work in the army.

In March 1919, V. I. Lenin pointed out that the problems of military organizational development were discussed literally at each Central Committee session and that there was no defense question for which the Central Committee or Central Committee Bureau did not work out its opinion and carry it out. For example, in 1919 alone, V. I. Lenin personally participated in the work of 14 plenums and 40 sessions of the Politburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee which settled military problems.

Being guided by the party, being linked with the working masses by unbreakable ties and being indoctrinated in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, the Red Army successfully defended the socialist state which was born out of revolution.

The Leninist ideas and principles of party leadership over the Armed Forces were the basis of the party's activities in the military area after the victorious end of the Civil War and the expulsion of the interventionists from Soviet land as well as during the years of peacetime socialist construction. During that period our party continued to be constantly concerned with strengthening national defense might and with creating the necessary material-technical, socio-political and spiritual prerequisites for raising the combat might of the Army and Navy. Under its leadership, technical reconstruction and reorganization of the Armed Forces were carried out. The troops and fleet received for those times modern military equipment and weapons as well as cadres of highly skilled commanders and political workers. Army and Navy personnel was tempered in moral-political terms and totally dedicated to the socialist motherland. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War and with its outset the questions of military organizational development occupied a central place in party activities.



During the years of the fascist invasion of our nation, our Leninist party was truly militant and fighting. Having assumed the entire responsibility for the course and outcome of an armed struggle unprecedented in scope and scale against the Nazi invaders, it subordinated all its revolutionary energy and will, its organizational and political art to achieving victory over them. Under its leadership the nation in a brief period of time was turned into a unified military camp. Through the appropriate state and military bodies, the party directed the strengthening of the Armed Forces and their combat operations. It was concerned with increasing the number of troops, raising the number and improving the quality of military equipment, ammunitions and weapons, strengthening the political-moral state of the personnel and developing military science and art. The plans for the major operations of the Great Patriotic War prepared by the General Staff or by the command of our fronts were examined at joint sessions of the Central Committee Politburo and Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command].

During the years of the struggle against Naziism, the CPSU elaborated a flexible and all-encompassing system of party, state and military leadership making it possible to strengthen its organizing and mobilizing effect on all national life and the combat activities of the Army and Navy. The party slogan "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!" became an unbreakable law in the life of the Soviet people. By the war's end, more than two-thirds of all the communists were in the Armed Forces as well as in the national economic sectors serving the needs of the front.

The communists set an example of intrepidity and heroism in the struggle against the hated enemy. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has written penetratingly about this in his book "Malaya Zemlya" ["The loyal sons of the party in its name they called the fighters to mortal battle. In the name of the motherland they called not to spare their life. And in combat they were the first to carry out what they had called upon others to perform, leading the fighters with them. They carried out Lenin's order to the end and by their personal example showed that a communist knows not only how to live nobly, but also how to die with dignity." One out of every four soldiers fighting against the enemy was a communist. Three million sons and daughters of the party died a death of the brave on the battlefields. But its ranks were not thinned and 5 million Soviet patriots filled out the ranks of the CPSU over the war years.

Thus, also during the years of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet people and their Armed Forces won a world historical victory over the shock forces of imperialism under the leadership of the Leninist party of communists. In the course of the fierce battles against the enemy, our party became ideologically tempered and strengthened its ranks and gained enormous experience in political and organizational work under combat conditions. At present this is of lasting importance in mobilizing the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy to further increase vigilance and constant readiness to defend the motherland.

At present, not only theoretically, but also extended historical practice have shown the objective need for Communist Party leadership over the entire question of military organizational development and the creation and strengthening of our Armed Forces. That precisely the Communist Party plays the leading role in the life and activity of the Army and Navy is the important advantage of the

military organization of a socialist state. Among all the other organizations of the workers, only the communist party is capable of correctly and scientifically solving the complex range of problems relating to national defense. The military councils, the command and political personnel, the party, Komsomol and trade union organizations in the Armed Forces steadily carry out CPSU policy and realize its plans.

The policy of the Communist Party expresses the concern of all the people for strengthening national defense, improving the Armed Forces and ensuring peaceful conditions for communist construction. The party has elaborated a scientifically sound military, including military-technical, policy. Its leadership encompasses various spheres of society's life--both those which determine the military might of the state as well as the Armed Forces directly in which this might is embodied. In other words, the basic content of party leadership in the military area consists of an entire system of measures from the organization of defense production and the training of military personnel to activities in the area of improving the Armed Forces themselves. This entire range of measures is embodied in the scientifically elaborated military policy of the CPSU and this determines the essence and basic content of activities by the state and social organizations in the defense area. On this basis all the diverse activities by the party are carried out in creating and developing the military organization of the socialist state and strengthening the combat might of our Army and Navy and the constant readiness of the troops to crushingly rebuff any aggressor.

Military policy is a component part of overall CPSU policy. Its strength and vitality consist in the fact that it is worked out on a sound foundation of Marxism-Leninism and Leninist teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland. The basic areas of CPSU military policy are: the scientific elaboration of a defense program; the elaboration and definition of defense doctrine of a socialist state; the elaboration and practical implementation of the organizational development principles for the Armed Forces as well as training and indoctrination of the personnel; defining the major areas of logistical support for the Army and Navy; the training of military personnel; the development of Soviet military art and science; ideological-political and psychological preparation of the servicemen and the entire population for possible military hardships, for a crushing rebuff to the imperialist aggressors and their supporters and so forth.

Daily organizational work holds a major place in the Communist Party's activities in directing military organizational development. This encompasses the questions of developing and strengthening the material and spiritual bases of the Soviet state's defense capability and increasing the combat might and readiness of its Armed Forces. The CPSU directs the work of the state bodies, social organizations and officials involved in ensuring the security and strengthening the defense capability of the nation. The party directs the training, correct recruitment and placement of the command, political, engineer and technical personnel in the Army and Navy and it mobilizes the Armed Forces personnel to skillfully use the material-technical base and the resources provided in the interests of steadily increasing the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

Party political work is a powerful means of the party's ideological influence in the Armed Forces. The CPSU devotes unflagging attention to improving its content, forms and methods as well as to bettering the indoctrination of the Soviet military. Party political work is the scientifically based ideological and party organizational activities of the military councils, commanders, political bodies and party organizations in carrying out the Leninist party's policy in the Armed Forces, indoctrinating the personnel in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and mobilizing them to carry out the tasks confronting the armed defenders of the motherland. This work includes a broad range of questions involving all aspects of training and service, the daily life of the Soviet military, their moral-political and psychological training. In mobilizing the men to carry out the tasks posed by the party in the area of defending the socialist victories of our people, the Army and Navy communists follow the instructions of V. I. Lenin that the preparation of the nation for defense requires not a rush campaign, not empty shouting, but rather "an extended, intense, most steady and disciplined work on a mass scale" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 325).

In concluding the first question, the propagandist must emphasize that Communist Party leadership over the life and activities of the Armed Forces is a pattern and highest principle in Soviet military organizational development, the main and crucial source of their uncrushable might. For all their victories, unsurpassable strength of spirit and might of modern weapons and military equipment, the Army and Navy of our state owe the Leninist communist party which has been able to realize the rich potentials of the new social system in the interests of defending socialist victories.

## 2. The Increased Role of the CPSU in Directing the Soviet Armed Forces under Present-Day Conditions

In disclosing the contents of the second question, it is essential to show that the strengthening of national defense and the steady rise in the combat might of the Armed Forces are dictated completely by the tense international situation and by the increased aggressiveness of world imperialism, primarily American. The world reaction headed by the U.S. ruling circles has taken cover behind the false fabrication about the "Soviet military threat" and is endeavoring at whatever price to upset the military strategic equilibrium existing between the two social systems and achieve military superiority over the USSR and its allies. "Under these conditions the Communist Party and the Soviet government," state the Greetings of the CPSU Central Committee to the participants of the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, "consider it their primary task to strengthen national defense in every possible way and increase the vigilance of the Soviet people."

The tasks of ensuring dependable national security and further developing and improving the Army and Navy in accord with modern requirements are complex and crucial. Their successful carrying out depends upon the foresightedness, upon and objective assessment of events on the international scene and upon exceptionally circumspect and at the same time most decisive measures to check the initiators of a new world war. Thus, under the complex conditions of the present international situation, the role of the Communist Party in organizing the defense of socialism and in directing the Armed Forces has immeasurably grown.

What factors have caused this process?

On the one hand, the general factors of the increased role of the CPSU under the conditions of developed socialism can be felt. These are: the ever-greater scope and complexity of the tasks of communist construction, the dynamic development of Soviet society, the increased creative activity of the workers, the further development of socialist democracy, the ever-wider involvement of the population in the administration of state and social affairs, the necessity of strengthening the communist indoctrination of the masses and so forth. On the other hand, the increased role of the CPSU in Army and Navy leadership is caused by specific features related to the defense of the socialist fatherland in the modern era, to the development of the Armed Forces and to the nature of the fundamental changes which have come about earlier and are presently occurring in military affairs on a basis of the scientific-technical revolution.

It is a question primarily of a further complicating of the tasks related to organizing the defense of the socialist fatherland in an age of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction. Never in the past has the question of preventing war, checking the aggressors and preserving peace been so acute. And never before has there been such enormous responsibility for the CPSU as a ruling party to dependably ensure the security of our state, peaceful conditions for communist construction and for defending the victories of socialism and peace.

The questions of strengthening the nation's defense capability are viewed by our party through the prism of solving the most vital problem of modern times, the problem of war and peace. The CPSU cannot disregard the increased military danger. For this reason in all its activities one can clearly trace a dialectical unity of consistent struggle for peace and international security and a constant readiness to decisively rebuff regression from wherever it might arise.

The increased role of party leadership over military organizational development is also caused by the qualitative changes which have occurred in the Armed Forces and military affairs as a whole. Rapid military-technical progress encompassing also the military area has led to the appearance of new weapons and to the accelerated obsolescence of military equipment. In a short period of time, in virtually every 10-12 years, the basic weapons systems are replaced. Considering this the party is doing everything so that the Soviet Army and Navy have the necessary means for repelling aggression.

The questions of further improving the USSR Armed Forces occupy one of the central places in the activities of the CPSU to strengthen national defense capability. This improvement is carried out in various areas and encompasses a broad range of problems. This includes the party's concern for equipping the Army and Navy with modern weapons and military equipment and determining a rational balance in the Armed Services and branches of troops. The CPSU directs the development of military science and military art, the training and indoctrination of the military cadres and all the personnel, the work of improving the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the organizing of combat, operational and moral-political training of the troops and also solves other important problems.

In creatively approaching Lenin's teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland, our party has enriched military theory and practice with many new concepts. The materials and decisions of the CPSU congresses, the plenums of its Central Committee, the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and the other party leaders, the work and research of our military chiefs and scientists have elaborated a number of theoretical problems relating to military organizational development, the strengthening and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces.

On the basis of Lenin's ideological heritage and scientific methodology, the fundamental problems of the class struggle of socialism and capitalism, the place and role of military means in this, the significance of the growing defense capability of the socialist nations for the fate of the world and the social progress of mankind continue to be reasoned out. In continuing to generalize and creatively study the experience of the last war, the party takes into account the particular features and requirements of armed combat which are placed upon the Army and Navy under present-day conditions. Under the leadership of the CPSU, Soviet military theoretical thought has achieved significant results in further studying the development patterns of military affairs, in researching the basic trends and directions in the organizational development of armies armed with nuclear missile weapons. It has thoroughly analyzed the nature of wars and military conflicts in the modern age as well as the state of military technical thought abroad. The corresponding conclusions have been drawn from this. In our nation, an entire range of important problems on military strategy, operational art and tactics has also been successfully solved.

Due to the daily attention of the party, the government and all the Soviet people, the USSR Armed Forces in recent years have taken a new step in their development. Their combat potential has become even stronger and this is a strong fusion of high technical equipping, military skill and unbreakable morale.

Then it is essential to point out that the increased role of the CPSU in the leadership of military organizational development has also been brought about by the greater significance of the moral-political factor in a war. A modern war, particularly a nuclear missile one, if the imperialists start it, will fundamentally alter the entire way of life of the people and will be accompanied by a psychological stress of unprecedented force, as was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov. The enormous scope, fierceness and acuteness of military operations demand the greatest physical and moral stress from the personnel of the Armed Forces and from all the people. This is why our party by its consistent, purposeful ideological and political-indoctrinational work constantly develops in the Soviet people and the Army and Navy personnel high moral-political qualities and a readiness and ability to ultimately carry out the sacred duty of defending the socialist motherland.

The growing role of the Communist Party in directing military organizational development is also caused as a consequence of the broadening and deepening of the international tasks of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces in the area of defending the victories of socialism. The CPSU gives great significance to analyzing the experience of the international defense of socialism and to the activities of the Warsaw Pact. The content and scope of the tasks in coordinating the defense efforts of the socialist nations are growing as is the scale

of work in coordinating them. The closest attention must be paid to the questions involving the elaboration of common views on the nature of modern war, the methods of waging it, the organizational principles in the development and improvement of the Joint Armed Forces as well as the content, forms and methods of training and indoctrinating the personnel in the friendly armies.

Under the conditions where our class enemy, imperialism, has been grouped in military blocs on the world scene, the CPSU and all the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties consider it their duty to develop in every possible way cooperation among the socialist states in the defense area as well as in other areas of life. This cooperation is permeated by a spirit of internationalism, it is based upon the principles of equality, mutual respect and sovereignty and includes the ever-closer coordinating of the development plans for the armed forces in the allied nations, the consistent carrying out of a unified military-technical policy, the coordinating of operational and other measures and an exchange of experience in the training and indoctrination of the personnel. This is also the purpose of the evermore fruitful collaboration among the political bodies and party organizations of the fraternal armies.

The role of party political work has particularly grown in carrying out the responsible tasks confronting the personnel of the USSR Armed Forces. Its further improvement depends completely upon the activeness, initiative, principledness and militancy of the political bodies, the Army and Navy party organizations which along with the commanders directly carry out party policy in the troops. This was professionally and thoroughly discussed at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. Participating in this were the leading command and political personnel of the Army and Navy. The conference pointed out that the Army and Navy party organizations are proving to be the leading force of the military collectives, their political nucleus and the center of daily ideological indoctrinational activities. They ensure an unflagging party influence on the carrying out of tasks confronting the subunits, units and ships. The main area of their work is daily concern for the strengthening of the Armed Forces and improving the combat readiness of the formations, units and ships as well as the quality of training and indoctrination for the personnel.

The political bodies and party organizations are constantly improving the diverse forms and means of ideological influence on the masses of servicemen. They are constantly concerned for developing a scientific ideology in the men, tempering them ideologically and morally and they are waging a consistent struggle against the penetration and bourgeois and revisionistic ideologies and morals which are alien to the Soviet way of life.

It must not be forgotten that the imperialist special services and centers in the area of ideological subversion are actively intensifying their feverish activities to distort the essence and content of party leadership over the USSR Armed Forces and to discredit their social nature, purpose and functions. They are endeavoring to debunk the noble image of the Soviet liberator-soldier in the eyes of the peoples of foreign nations and to play down the immortal feat of our Army and Navy in defeating Naziism. Imperialist propaganda has set the goal of blunting the political vigilance of the Soviet military, shaking their loyalty to the Communist Party, to the people and to the great ideals of

communism and ultimately undermine the political-moral state of the personnel and their readiness to rebuff the aggressors.

Under these conditions the CPSU demands the showing of constant vigilance, a continuous rise in political maturity of the personnel, personal responsibility of the men for the defense of the motherland and the indoctrinating of a burning hate for the imperialists and their supporters. Our duty is to oppose the subversive political and ideological activities of the class enemy and its evil slander of socialism and our Armed Forces with unshakable solidarity, a strong unity of their ranks, profound conviction and political vigilance on the part of each Soviet serviceman and his readiness to defend the motherland and the great victories of socialism courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honor.

The CPSU gives particular importance to ensuring high combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. Its basic criterion is the ability at any moment, under the most complicated conditions to repel and thwart aggression against the socialist world, wherever it might arise. Combat readiness is the main indicator for the qualitative state of the troops and naval forces. It brings together the results of the diverse activities of the commanders and political workers, the staffs, the political bodies and party organizations and all the Armed Forces personnel. It reflects their ability to carry out their basic mission to securely protect the socialist victories, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and ensure the security of our nation, its friends and allies. "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people," states Article 31 of the USSR Constitution, "is to securely defend the socialist fatherland, to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff of any aggressor."

Each day it is essential to maintain the high combat readiness of the Armed Forces on a level of the constantly increasing demands. The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress oblige us to see to it that the Soviet people in the future can be confident that our Armed Forces are always ready to successfully repel the enemy's aggression and that any possible aggressor in the event of attempting to attack the Soviet nation will receive a devastating retaliatory blow.

The exemplary fulfillment of patriotic duty to the party and people requires that the men of the Army and Navy constantly master military skills and be able to hit the targets with the first round, the first launch of a missile, the first attack in air and sea combat. To achieve this in exercises and drills it is essential constantly to endeavor to act as in true combat, without oversimplifications and weaknesses and to show initiative and creative boldness. In a word, it is essential, as V. I. Lenin admonished us, to study military affairs truly and to develop in ourselves a desire to conquer the enemy under any circumstances.

In bringing out to the students the essence of patriotic duty to the party and people as well as their constitutional duty to always be in combat readiness and on guard, the propagandist, using examples from the life of his subunit, unit (ship), must show how the leading men are serving and what others can learn from them so that they also can be among the right flankers of the socialist competition. It is essential to remind the students that, in participating in the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR under the motto "Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" each man must show a maximum of tenacity and endeavor in

carrying out the obligations assumed by him personally or by the subunit as a whole. It is particularly important to emphasize that the contribution of each determines the success of the entire collective in raising combat readiness and in carrying out the tasks of combat and political training on a high level.

In completing a description of the subject, it is essential to conclude that the Communist Party is constantly concerned with strengthening the security of our motherland. CPSU policy, its leadership over the Armed Forces have been, are and will be in the future a guarantee for the invincible defense capability of the socialist state of all the people and an inexhaustible source of might for the Army and Navy of the Soviet state.

In the course of independent preparations, it is recommended that the students study the Report of the Central Committee to the Ninth RKP(b) Congress given by V. I. Lenin on 29 March 1920 (PSS, Vol 40, pp 240-241); the Program of the CPSU, pp 110-112; the USSR Constitution (Basic Law) (Articles 6, 31, 32, 62 and 63); the Report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], pp 66, 68); the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 19th Komsomol Congress (PRAVDA, 19 May 1982); the report of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 11, 1982); Chapter 4 of the textbook for political exercises "V. I. Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [V. I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland] (Voyenizdat, 1981).

In discussing the subject at the seminar (in a talk), the following questions can be raised for the students: 1. What significance did V. I. Lenin give to the Communist Party's leadership over military organizational development? 2. Why is CPSU leadership the highest principle in Soviet military organizational development? 3. How is the leading role of the party manifested in achieving the historical victories of the Soviet people over the enemies of socialism? 4. What are the reasons which have caused the increased role of the CPSU in the leadership over the Soviet Armed Forces under present-day conditions? 5. What are the basic areas in the Communist Party's activities to strengthen the Army and Navy? 6. What at present is the patriotic duty of the servicemen to the party and people?

#### Literature for Propagandists

1. V. I. Lenin, "State and Revolution," PSS, Vol 33, p 26.
2. V. I. Lenin, "The Ninth RKP(b) Congress. Report of the Central Committee of 29 March," PSS, Vol 40, pp 240-241.
3. "Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program], pp 136-141.
4. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [The USSR Constitution (Basic Law)], Chapters I, V, VII.



5. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 66, 68.
6. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the 19th Komsomol Congress," PRAVDA, 19 May 1982.
7. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 24 May 1982," PRAVDA, 25 May 1982.
8. "O dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 26 aprelya 1979 goda" [On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979].
9. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee," PRAVDA, 21 February 1982.
10. D. F. Ustinov, "Report at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries," KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 11, 1982.
11. D. F. Ustinov, "Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma" [We Serve the Motherland and the Cause of Communism], Voenizdat, 1982.

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## ARMED FORCES

### REPLIES TO READERS' QUESTIONS ON PARTY PROCEDURES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 82 (signed to press 18 Jun 82) p 71

[Unattributed replies to reader correspondence: "From Correspondence with Readers"]

[Text] [Reader's letter] Dear Comrades! I turn to you with an unusual request. Its essence is as follows.

A party meeting was held in our subunit which examined the application of Anatoliy Grigor'yevich Voronin on his admission to membership in the CPSU. I refrained from voting to admit Comrade Voronin into the party. I explained to the communists why I had done this. The problem was that I had not been long in this subunit, just 5 months. Moreover, Voronin had been away from the unit for about 2 months. Thus, I knew him just 3 months, in a word, I knew him poorly. Hence, I resolved to vote neither "for" nor "against," and this I frankly told the communists. No questions were asked of me at the meeting. Comrade Voronin was admitted to the CPSU by an absolute majority of votes.

Then the secretary publically rebuked me having said that I was a coward, that "I had no business in this," and that I was afraid to assume responsibility and so forth. This insulted me greatly. I urgently request that you explain to me if I have done wrong in abstaining from voting.

V. Belov, CPSU Member

[Editor's reply] Dear Comrade Belov, certainly you are in no way at fault that you abstained in voting to admit A. G. Voronin to the CPSU. Judging from your letter, you had little knowledge of the candidate. Certainly each communist should be concerned primarily with improving the quality of those admitted to the CPSU, approach an examination of the applications of a candidate strictly individually and have a good knowledge of this person from practical work as well as his political, professional and moral qualities. Only under this condition can a CPSU member form an opinion of whether or not a comrade is worthy of being in the party and whether he meets the demands placed upon a communist. If a CPSU member has not formed such a thoroughly rounded opinion about a candidate, he is right to abstain. There is no reason in the given instance to rush a communist with conclusions on the candidate's application, let alone accuse him or blame him for the impossibility of voicing a definite opinion.

[Reader's letter] Would you please explain whether it is possible to lift several party reprimands simultaneously from a communist?

Sr Lt S. Mushtakov

[Editor's reply] If a CPSU member or candidate member having party reprimands has fully expiated his guilt to the party, if he observes party and military discipline and takes an active part in carrying out the party decisions, then a party organization or commission under a political body has the right to lift several party reprimands from him simultaneously.

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## ARMED FORCES

### CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED SHORTCOMINGS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 82 (signed to press 18 Jun 82) p 80

[Unattributed article: "Follow-Up on the Journal's Actions"]

[Text] The article by the deputy executive secretary of the party commission under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Maj Gen A. Shcheglakov entitled "According to the Laws of Party Life" published in issue No 6 of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL raised questions related to improving the activities of party commissions under the Army and Navy political bodies. The article noted the great role played by the party commissions in the ideological and organizational strengthening of the party collectives, in struggling for the purity of the CPSU ranks, in checking on the fulfillment of the CPSU By-Laws by the party members and candidate members as well as the observing of party, state and military discipline and in increasing the responsibility of the communists for carrying out party policy. In line with this critical comments were addressed to the party commissions under the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSVG], the Political Department of the Staff and Directorates of the Northern Group of Forces and the Political Department of the Simferopol Higher Military Political Construction School.

As the editors were informed by the military council member and chief of the Political Directorate of the GSVG, Col Gen I. Gubin, considering the criticism contained in the article, measures have been outlined aimed at improving the forms and methods of work carried out by the party commissions under the Political Directorate as well as under the political departments of the GSVG units and formations.

The Political Directorate has recommended that the article be discussed in all the political bodies. In March 1982, the officers of the Political Directorate analyzed how the leadership over the activities of the party commissions had been organized in a number of political bodies. From the results of the work exercises were held with the instructors of the political bodies and with the secretaries of the party commissions and a special review is being prepared.

The questions of improving the leadership of the party commissions, strengthening their influence on the carrying out of the CPSU By-Laws by the communists and the observing of party, state and military discipline will be discussed at a forthcoming assembly of the chiefs of the political bodies.

As for Col V. Brusnev and other officers guilty of the illegal expenditure of state funds, the letter states, all of them have been held responsible to the party.

The letter received by the editors over the signature of the First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Northern Group of Forces, Maj Gen A. Rodnikov, states that the article "According to the Laws of Party Life" and the critical comments contained in it addressed to the political department and staff and the directorates of the Northern Group of Forces were discussed with the officers from the political directorate of the group of forces and with the chiefs of the political bodies. Measures have been adopted aimed at improving the work style of the party commissions under the political bodies, strengthening their influence on ensuring the vanguard role of the communists in training and service as well as the observing of the requirements of the CPSU By-Laws by them.

The editors have also received a letter from the Simferopol Higher Military-Political Construction School. Col V. Pavlichenko has confirmed that there were instances when several cases of admission to the party were examined simultaneously at certain sessions of the party commission and at sessions of the party committees. The article "According to the Laws of Party Life" was discussed by the political department, at a session of the party committee and at a seminar of party organization secretaries. The question of further improving the work of the party organizations in the area of improving the quality of the party ranks in light of the demands of the 26th Party Congress and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of the Kirghizia Party Organizations in Admitting and Indoctrinating CPSU Candidate Members" was reviewed in the primary party organizations.

The school political department, the letter states, has outlined measures the implementation of which will make it possible to ensure a higher quality recruitment of officer candidates into the ranks of the CPSU as well as the indoctrinating of high party qualities in them.

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## GROUND FORCES

### MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS: ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS IN BATTLE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Aug 81 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col A. Polyakov: "Troop Field Schooling: These Kinds of 'Trifles'..."]

[Text] The infantry fighting vehicles approached the river swiftly and entered the water without slowing, firing while afloat. The motorized rifle company commanded by Sr Lt K. Derevyanchenko was attacking the "enemy" on the opposite bank, expanding the bridgehead captured by the forward detachment.

The tank battalion commanded by Capt S. Utlyakov was to build up success in combat. The tanks approached the river after the infantry fighting vehicles and began to cross it over the bottom.

Not all the vehicles, however, emerged on the opposite bank.

What had happened?

After making the march, the battalion arrived at the river. Relying on the fact that the driver-mechanics had taken a frogman training course and had performed the exercise in driving on land and under water using the directional gyroscope, the officers responsible for preparing equipment and personnel for underwater driving permitted themselves to be complacent. They didn't pay attention to many so-called "trifles," and this led to serious consequences.

Several tanks crossed the water obstacle safely and emerged on the opposite bank. At this moment the battalion commander heard a report from one of the crew commanders:

"The engine stalled."

"Restart," ordered the officer by radio.

The engine did not start, and in a matter of seconds an anxious report reached him:

"Water in the fighting compartment..."

Its level rose swiftly, the scavenging pump was not coping, and the battalion commander ordered the crew to put on breathing apparatus. At this time a recovery and rescue team headed by Maj V. Katsur already was fussing about the tank which had stopped under the water. But things also were not going well for the rescuers: They could in no way get the tow line.

But time was passing. The battalion commander kept in touch with the crew and cheered it up, realizing how difficult it was to be in a tank filling with water. When it was impossible to wait further he ordered the crew to abandon the tank.

After crossing to the opposite bank on an amphibious transporter we learned what had happened.

As it turned out, in checking the vehicle's preparation before the descent into the water, platoon commander Lt S. Grigor'yev had been careless about this. And Sr Lt S. Kosilov, the deputy company commander for technical matters, was guilty of very inexcusable negligence. He not only was supposed to inspect, but also check secure closure of covers and hatches, but he did not.

The deputy regimental commander for technical matters, who was responsible for organizing equipment preparation for underwater driving, also bears responsibility for what happened. He too did not display proper exactingness.

The recovery and rescue team also was tripped up by "trifles." As it was learned, the tank crew had not fastened special buoys correctly to the tow line. The one that was supposed to be on the front was on the back. The recovery and rescue team's prime movers which dragged the tank by the rear line almost overturned the vehicle.

The shots of this phase of the exercise died down and emotions calmed. It was decided to check the next company's tanks and go over matters of underwater driving carefully. It seemed everything now would be fine, but then the second tank already halted under the water. The engine stalled...

It is impossible to disagree with the fact that this exercise clearly highlighted serious deficiencies in personnel training and in the training of certain unit officials. Some officers' actions in the assault crossing indicate that it was a long while since they had looked at guidance documents and that they were relying on old knowledge. It became clear from talks with the crews and subunit officers that technical training classes in the tank battalion often were disrupted and were conducted under oversimplified conditions. In preparing for underwater driving here more attention was given to seeing that the driver-mechanics accurately maintained the direction of movement, and little concern was shown for knowledge of the equipment or the ability to handle it.

Following the exercise I revisited the tankmen and asked the regimental political deputy what conclusions had been drawn by the party committee and party members from everything that had happened that day. It turned out, however, that the necessary conclusions had not yet been drawn here. They apparently decided that nothing serious had happened...

## GROUND FORCES

### MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS: RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen V. Ivanov, candidate of military sciences, of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "The Commander and Modern Combat: Reconnaissance in an Exercise"]

[Text] The motorized rifle battalion commanded by Maj V. Gazaryan took up a position in front of the "enemy" forward edge of defense with the onset of darkness. It replaced a subunit in this sector which the regimental commander had placed in reserve.

The companies were preparing for an attack. After an artillery fire preparation at dawn, the battalion moved into the attack as part of the regiment, but it turned out that the motorized riflemen were attacking empty trenches in this sector. That night the "enemy" had withdrawn his subunits into the depth of defenses. Moreover, on one of the lines he counterattacked from a direction in which Gazaryan had not imagined encountering a tank reserve. The battalion was forced to withdraw to the initial line.

Just what happened? The fact is that on the eve of the attack the commander of the battalion which had left the positions did everything possible to ensure that Maj Gazaryan had most complete intelligence about the "enemy." To this end they had conducted a joint ground reconnaissance and in particular updated the outline of the forward edge and position of identified weapons. In subsequent work of preparing for combat, however, Gazaryan limited himself only to this information. He did not even take the trouble to see that observation posts were assigned to perform reconnaissance, and that observers were assigned in the companies. Perhaps the reason for this attitude toward reconnaissance was that the battalion commander received a large amount of information from the regimental staff and counted on nothing essential happening in a few nighttime hours.

How can such carelessness and such disregard of reconnaissance arrangements be explained? Let us single out probably the most essential point. The battalion often accomplished missions of a reconnaissance nature with oversimplifications. A situation sometimes would be created in exercises which did not evoke the commanders' desire to conduct active and continuous reconnaissance. In particular, as was the case in this instance, the battalion commander often would be given information from above, from the regimental



staff, to a greater extent than authorized. At times he even would receive ready-made conclusions about the "enemy." This disservice, if it can be thus described, also was done by planning both tactical drill problems and practice combat on one and the same terrain. It even happened that the regimental chief of staff and intelligence officer would substitute for officers, shifting to themselves the duties of battalion commander or reconnaissance platoon commander.

All these indulgences reaffirmed that success won't be achieved in combat, even having the most sophisticated equipment, well trained personnel and superiority in personnel and weapons if one has a poor knowledge of the enemy and if reconnaissance is not conducted.

Frontline commanders loved to repeat the comprehensive and laconic formula: Not a step without reconnaissance! They would emphasize two of its factors in particular. A thorough and comprehensive study of the enemy is above all the consideration of all his capabilities which might affect the course of battle to a certain extent. Study the enemy and consequently come to know his strong and weak points, and choose one's tactics in conformity with this.

It is understandable that conditions for conducting reconnaissance in tactical exercises differ from those arising in actual combat. It is difficult to create a situation model where reconnaissance missions can be accomplished to the full extent using various methods of conducting reconnaissance. The experience of organizing reconnaissance training in foremost units, however, persuasively confirms that this difficulty is surmountable.

Let's return again to the example of the battalion's unsuccessful actions. We will note that the continuous, active and purposeful reconnaissance conducted by the opposing side played no small part here. In particular the "enemy" took advantage of the fact that observation relaxed in the motorized rifle battalion at night and his regimental scouts managed to find out which forces would develop the attack and in what direction. Subunits from the motorized rifle regiment commanded by Lt Col V. Brezgun were operating against the battalion.

In addition to scheduled reconnaissance training classes, this regiment conducts training in the art of reconnaissance also in classes in tactical, weapons, engineer and physical training and in the command training system in the course of group exercises, short tactical training problems and practice sessions. For example, in making a march the commanders usually work lessons in reconnoitering a movement route, determining passability of terrain for particular pieces of equipment, evaluating the difficulty of natural and man-made obstacles, and choosing the most appropriate places for crossing them.

Courses for scout-observers are held here regularly. Here each of them is provided with a set of formatted documents and necessary instruments and accessories for conducting reconnaissance under various conditions. Soldiers learn to set up an observation post at a special training station made at the range. A saturated target environment permits the class instructor to teach observers to intersect targets using devices and attachments, and accurately determine coordinates and the distance to them.

There is simultaneous training in operating communications gear and in the ability to orient oneself on the terrain and distinguish enemy objects based on characteristic external and audible signs. Missions involving the collection of reconnaissance information and arrangement of ambushes, sweeps and raids are practiced in tactical drill problems. In group exercises battalion and company level officers solve problems involving the organization and conduct of reconnaissance in force. A so-called "scout's corner" has been set up in the tactics classroom.

It cannot of course be said that the regiment has used all reserves. For example, the training facility requires further improvement and a special simulator must be adopted in training practice. The command training system does not give full consideration, especially in group exercises, to the specific features of mountain-desert terrain on which reconnaissance will have to be conducted. There could be great benefit, for example, from joint tactical drill problems of combined-arms subunits with subunits of combat arms and special troops. Here the commanders acquire the ability to accomplish missions comprehensively using information received both from their own reconnaissance entities and from those of the artillerymen, air defense personnel and combat engineers.

It stands to reason that tactical exercises represent the chief school for reconnaissance training. Here is where the commanders' ability is forged, if it can be thus expressed, to look by way of the reconnaissance entities beyond the tactical zone of combat actions into the depth of "enemy" defenses.

One cannot fail to consider that the enemy has the capability to counter reconnaissance by means of dissemination of false information and by concealment of actions. What is to be done in such instances? There are many ways to solve the problem. One thing is for sure: The commander must keep his hand firmly on the "pulse" of combat. This means not only knowing the probable enemy and his combat capabilities thoroughly and comprehensively, but also controlling reconnaissance firmly by using all methods to conduct it.

It is true that at times one can hear such opinions: It is difficult for the company or battalion to undertake something substantial inasmuch as their reconnaissance capabilities are limited. Indeed, ambushes, a sweep and combat reconnaissance patrols usually are arranged on orders of the senior commander, but it must not be forgotten that the company and battalion in combat are in direct contact with the enemy. The very best opportunity to obtain the latest information and obtain it most efficiently is present here.

One of the ways of improving reconnaissance training is to study frontline experience. In the subunit where Maj A. Laaneots is chief of staff class instructors usually play out with trainees the most typical frontline reconnaissance episodes for a particular kind of combat prior to an exercise on the tactical field, a terrain model and specially drawn diagrams. They naturally cannot get by here without a correction for time and for the new capabilities of reconnaissance equipment. But there is no question that concrete material from wartime experience permits the officers to comprehend more thoroughly the operating methods of reconnaissance entities in modern combat as well.

Broad opportunities present themselves in the summer training period for sharpening field and tactical schooling. In addition to the mastery of weapons and equipment and of the techniques and methods of conducting combat operations, it is important to teach troops reliable combat support, including the conduct of reconnaissance. Herein is a guarantee of high combat readiness and effectiveness of the subunits and units to accomplish any mission under various conditions of a situation.

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## GROUND FORCES

### ATTACK FAILS, ANALYZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Aug 82 p 1

[Article by Col R. Dukov: "Troop Field Schooling: Why the Attack Failed"]

[Text] The battalion commanded by Maj N. Yeritov was advancing swiftly. At this time the battalion commander received a report that the "enemy" was making a counterattack. Maj Yeritov assigned a mission to the right-flank company commanded by Sr Lt A. Zuyev to maneuver and hold up the counter-attackers.

The company advanced swiftly to the designated line, but it didn't have to take part in the practice combat. The "enemy" was counterattacking in a different spot.

Just how did it happen that at the very height of combat the company was disengaged from it and took up positions on a secondary axis? And not only the company, for attached to it also were tanks and antitank weapons, removed, by the way, from the flanks on which the "enemy" was counterattacking.

The formal reason can be said to be clear. As the battalion commander explained, he simply made a slip in assigning the mission by radio and named one populated point instead of another.

Unfortunately we counted many such inaccuracies in commands being given to the subunits and in reports coming in from the company commanders. In one case, for example, the location in the combat formation of the artillery battery attached to the battalion was given inaccurately. As a result, in one of the phases it was not able to move to a designated line promptly and support the attack by fire. In another case the commander of the combat reconnaissance patrol confused the battalion commander when he incorrectly plotted the location of a concentration of "enemy" infantry on the map...

The list of mistakes could be continued. They arose above all for the reason that insufficient attention was given to matters of staff culture in classes conducted with officers in the command training system, particularly the practice of command language and accuracy in depicting the tactical situation on maps. This showed up graphically in the exercise.

Was this noted earlier on the regimental staff? Judging from the documents, staff representatives and the chiefs of combat arms and services repeatedly attended command classes. Excellent or good grades show up opposite the names of Maj Yeritov, Sr Lt Zuyev and other battalion officers in command training registers. As a rule their ability to control subunits also was given the highest grade in group exercises, short tactical training problems and practice sessions. But the exercise mentioned above showed that this ability was tested under oversimplified conditions and the officers' attention was rarely directed to verbosity in assigning missions and to vagueness of reports and commands.

It was A. V. Suvorov who said that nothing so leads people to harm as a weak command. If it has been uttered and passed on inaccurately, expect failure. The exercise experience graphically confirms this. In this instance it is important to learn lessons from such experience. But when this does not happen, the shortcomings are repeated. Moreover, training time and engine resources are wasted.

Here is an example. The tank battalion commanded by Capt Zh. Volkov was attacking in the depth of "enemy" defenses. On one line the "enemy" moved up a reserve for a counterattack. Capt Volkov decided to repulse the counterattack from in place, using a portion of the subunit of the artillery battalion supporting his battalion for this purpose. But in observing the course of combat the officer realized that fire support of the entire artillery battalion would be needed to achieve success. He transmitted a radio signal but the artillery ceased fire. Taking advantage of this, the "enemy" rapidly moved tanks forward and counterattacked the battalion's combat formations resolutely.

What happened? It turned out that instead of a signal which in the table denoted a concentration of battalion fire, the battalion commander gave a command meaning to cease fire. After the action Capt Volkov was distressed:

"I can't understand how I could confuse the signals..."

Then one of the officers from division headquarters noted:

"Comrade Captain, you repeated the mistake made in the last exercise. Only then callsigns for the company commanders were confused and as a result one of the subunits made a mistake in performing a maneuver. Now do you understand what comes from a formal attitude toward radio practices?"

Skills in working with communications gear and punctuality and precision in transmitting commands do not come of themselves. This is facilitated by carefully conceived and well organized command training, particularly work with radios against a tactical background. There is a certain procedure in transmitting commands and assigning missions by radio, but the airwaves often are polluted with superfluous words, various clarifications, and so on. All this leads to mistakes and violations of communications security.

This is one aspect of the matter. Another is that many unnecessary equipment movements are permitted in practice combat. For example, how can we speak of efficiency of an exercise or rational use of engine resources when a company or battalion covered a good ten extra kilometers before arriving in a designated area as a result of imprecise instructions? In actual combat this could lead to undesired consequences.

I recall one frontline episode where our regiment received a mission for pursuing a retreating enemy. A fight ensued on one line. Thanks to a swift dash by our subunits the fascists were almost encircled. It remained to close a small corridor on the right flank to prevent them from slipping out of the circle.

A battalion commanded by Capt D. Vasil'yev was operating on this axis. Instead of issuing instructions promptly by radio to the company commanders, the battalion commander halted the subunits and began to explain the concept of the mission. Moreover, a direction of maneuver was not given quite accurately to the left-flank company and it was late in moving to a line and came under enemy fire. This is what imprecise control means!

Now, in the final phase of the training year, which is filled with exercises, the personnel are working in the field an especially great deal. And the more difficult the situation in command training system classes and in every exercise, the more benefit there will be for the trainees.

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## STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

### POLITICAL TRAINING OF OFFICERS DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 13, Jul 82 (signed to press 18 Jun 82) pp 43-48

[Article by Maj Gen V. Lukin, deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Strategic Rocket Forces: "Focus on the Political Training of the Officers"]

[Text] The Soviet people and their valorous Armed Forces are preparing to properly celebrate the significant event in the history of our state, the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. This glorious jubilee is being celebrated everywhere by new achievements in carrying out the historic plans of the 26th CPSU Congress and the plans for communist creation. All the Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces have viewed as an event of enormous importance the decisions of the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the report at it by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "On the USSR Food Program for the Period Up to 1990 and the Measures to Implement It." The provisions of this program meet the fundamental interests of the people. They have caused among the workers of the city and countryside a great political upsurge and a determination to devote all their efforts to carrying out the tasks set by the party and to add to the might of our socialist fatherland.

The Soviet military ardently and unanimously approved the policy of our Leninist party and the measures adopted by it to improve the prosperity of the people. By their unflagging military service they are endeavoring to strengthen the defense capability of the nation and the combat readiness of the military collectives as well as to strengthen discipline and order in their ranks. The commanders, political bodies and party organizations are focusing their efforts on further raising the level of ideological indoctrination in the masses of soldiers and to bring this closer to the increased demands of the party. This work has assumed particular scope after the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. The conference pointed out that the ideological indoctrination of the Army and Navy personnel should be carried out even more aggressively, with high quality and effectiveness. It should have an effective impact on uniting the military collectives and on achieving high results in military service. It should actively develop revolutionary vigilance and class self-awareness among the defenders of the motherland. The necessity was also pointed out of seeing to it that everywhere each party organization and each party group in fact becomes a center of daily ideological indoctrinational activities.

In determining the tasks for further improving ideological and political indoctrination by the party, at the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that in essence it is a question of reorganizing many areas and spheres of it. It is essential to see to it, he stressed, that the content of this work becomes more timely while the forms should meet the present-day needs and requests of the Soviet people.

This demand applies fully also to the Marxist-Leninist education of officer personnel. The new Marxist-Leninist training curriculums encompass a broad range of theoretical and practical problems disclosing the basic aspects of the party's leading activities at the present stage and its domestic and foreign policy in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Marxist-Leninist studies help the officers and generals profoundly understand the general patterns and principles of communist and military development, the specific laws of armed combat and the scientific principles of training and indoctrinating the men. This helps them to objectively assess their own activities and to find ways for further increasing the level of combat and political training and successfully carrying out the set tasks.

Ideological life in the party organizations of the Strategic Rocket Forces in recent years has been enriched in content and become more diverse in forms. The units and subunits have done and are doing a good deal to carry out the demands of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination," to ensure a high scientific level in propaganda and link it closely with life and the carrying out of the set tasks as well as giving it an offensive nature. The main thing that presently characterizes ideological work and at the same time is one of the decisive sources of its effectiveness is the increased interest among the officer personnel, and primarily the communists, in Marxist-Leninist theory and the evermore active study by them of the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and the other party documents.

The practice of long-range planning for the ideological and theoretical studies of the officers has proven effective. On the basis of the long-range plans, personal plans are drawn up for the quarter, for the training period and for the year. These envisage the officers' independent study of the recommended works by V. I. Lenin, the party and government decisions and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

A key element in party leadership over Marxist-Leninist education is work with the propagandists, for, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, the quality of the lectures is completely determined by the lecturers. The 26th Party Congress pointed to the exceptional role of the propagandist as the main figure in the system of party studies. The ideological-theoretical level of the exercises and their effectiveness depend primarily upon him.

The political directorate, the commanders and political bodies of our service have shown particular concern for the recruitment and ideological-theoretical and procedural training of the group leaders. Good conditions are created for them to improve their knowledge and raise their propagandist skills.



Definite positive experience in this area has been acquired in the work of the party committee where Officer A. Shalagin is a member. Here it has become a rule prior to the start of the training year to examine and approve the candidate group leaders at a party committee session and in the course of the training year to hear reports about their work.

The party committee pays particular attention to the effective holding of the permanent seminars and instructional-procedural exercises for the group leaders. Lectures are given at the seminars on the urgent problems of Marxist-Leninist theory and CPSU policy as well as on the questions of communist indoctrination. The commanders speak regularly before the seminar students providing thorough information on the next tasks in raising combat readiness, the quality of military and political training and the state of military discipline.

At the seminars practical skills are actively inculcated in the propagandists in the area of the Leninist art of communist propaganda, the ability to persuade listeners, to carefully prove the truth of their views and to study and consider public opinion. For this purpose recently the seminars have discussed such questions as: "V. I. Lenin on Speaker Skills," "Pedagogical Abilities of a Propagandist," "The Propagandist--The Proponent of Party Ideas in the Masses" and others. For each seminar visual aids are prepared and films, filmstrips, slides and recordings are selected.

Each month in the unit propagandist days are held and during these the officers can gain effective information on the questions of domestic and international life and can become acquainted with new political and artistic literature.

The party committee has generalized and disseminated the experience of the group leader, Officer B. Andryushchenko. He excels in a profound knowledge of party theory and policy and an ability to organize his work with the students intelligently, creatively and considering modern requirements. The positive experience of this officer was vividly and convincingly described at a regular propagandist day and in a leaflet specially devoted to the best group leader.

As is known, the expertise of the propagandists, their competence and responsibility for the assigned job are largely determined by the level of work done with them by the political bodies, the party committees and bureaus. At present, when the scope of ideological indoctrination has increased and its tasks have become more complex, this work cannot be carried out in the old manner. It is no secret that the measures carried out by the propagandists at times are insufficiently effective and do not achieve their goal. In some places the seminars for the leaders of Marxist-Leninist training groups are still conducted by rote. At times the matter comes down to "forcing" the propagandists to attend lectures on the given subject which are not marked by a profound content or a clear form of exposition for the material. There are also flaws in selecting the propagandists and in arming them with advanced procedures for training and indoctrinating the personnel. Clearly, such a situation should be rectified. Here the political bodies have much to do.

As practice shows, the group leaders receive great benefit from the open lessons and the discussion of such questions as the procedure for giving lectures,

using teaching equipment, working with a book, examining methods which increase the cognitive activity of the students and so forth.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Party Studies in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress" pointed to an important task, that is, developing active forms of Marxist-Leninist studies and improving the methods for giving lectures, seminar exercises and independent study. Practice provides many examples of using such forms as the discussion of reports and abstracts and the holding of debates and talks at the exercises.

The CPSU Central Committee has urged us to introduce into political training the method of special problem studies as one of the important ways to develop the creative thinking of the students and to instill in them the habits of the independent acquisition of knowledge. The question of the special problem method of instruction was widely discussed at the recent courses and seminars for the leaders of the officer Marxist-Leninist study groups as well as with other non-T/O propagandists.

It must be pointed out that the introduction of the method of special problem study places high demands on the propagandist. He should have a good mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory and the methods of party propaganda. The experience of the best propagandists clearly shows that if the crucial questions are taken up in a lecture in such a manner that they arouse the students to reflect, then such a lecture acquires effective strength.

There is much that is instructive in this regard in the work of the leader of the Marxist-Leninist study group, the communist I. Yurov. He is a thoughtful and skilled propagandist. He systematically is involved in political self-education and sees to it that the students thoroughly study the recommended literature. He carefully thinks out the plans for the forthcoming seminar exercises and prepares visual aids and propaganda equipment for them. He helps the students also in preparing abstracts. In the seminars he endeavors to create an unforced creative atmosphere and encourages the students to ask the speaker questions and initiate debates. In the process of the exercises I. Yurov endeavors for the students to delve deeply into the essence of the studied problems, he develops their ability to analyze the events and phenomena of social life from Marxist-Leninist positions and endeavors that each speech be closely tied to life and practical tasks. It is no accident that during a recent inspection the officers of this group showed profound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and the materials of the 26th Party Congress as well as high results in combat skill. Some 75 percent of the group's students are outstanding men in military and political training, all the officers have an increased class rating and one out of every two has become a master of military affairs.

It is essential to particularly note that in the troops a good practice has developed of active participation by the leadership in the political studies of the officers. More than 70 percent of the unit commanders are leaders of Marxist-Leninist study groups. This allows them to become directly involved in indoctrinating their subordinates, to follow their ideological growth, to more closely tie theory with the practical activities of the officers and increase their sense of responsibility for carrying out service duties.

Theoretical conferences and colloquiums, lecture series, Lenin readings, special reviews of materials in the periodic press, new political and military literature and other measures help significantly in broadening the political viewpoint of the officers and arming them with pedagogical knowledge and practical skills in indoctrinational work with the personnel. For example, theoretical conferences on "The 26th CPSU Congress on the Ideological Indoctrination Work of the Party under Present-Day Conditions," "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Scientific Fundamentals of Control," "The Growing Role of Scientific Troop Leadership in Achieving Victory in Modern War" and others served these goals.

This year, in the units reader conferences were conducted with great interest on the book by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs]. This book is a stirring story of love for the motherland and the spiritual richness of the Soviet man. The conference participants shared their impressions also on the other works of L. I. Brezhnev such as "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth], "Tselina" [Virgin Lands] and "Vospominaniya." Here they stressed the enormous significance of the theoretical generalizations, conclusions and recommendations contained in them for the practical activities of the officers. The books in the true sense have become desk aids in which the officer personnel finds answers to the most urgent questions of the training and indoctrination of the personnel. They teach a Leninist style of work.

Practice and many years of experience have convinced us that however effective the planned exercises on Marxist-Leninist training and additional measures in broadening the political viewpoint of the officers may be, the basic method for them to master Marxist-Leninist theory has been and remains independent work. In carrying out the demands of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Party Studies in Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress," the political bodies and party organizations have begun to devote more attention to the political self-education of the officers. In each unit the necessary conditions have been created for increasing the ideological-theoretical level of the commanders, the political workers and engineers. Many officers have personal libraries with the works of V. I. Lenin, party documents and political and military literature. Each officer subscribes to newspapers and sociopolitical journals.

The officers have been aided greatly in their independent work by the procedural labs and reference information centers which have been organized in all units. The reference-information center in the unit where Officer O. Malinin serves is rightly popular. Here the officers can obtain information on the urgent questions of party theory and practice, become familiar with special subject selections of materials from periodicals, as well as utilize the necessary political and educational literature, references, albums of visual aids, training plans, procedural studies and other propaganda materials as well as equipment.

The workers and activists at the reference-information center are actively and thoroughly explaining the materials of the May (1982) Plenum of the Party Central Committee and the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "On the USSR Food Program for the Period Up to 1990 and the Measures to Implement It" as well as the decrees adopted by the plenum. In particular, stands have been made up with materials showing the problems of the party's agrarian policy and for the

creation of the agroindustrial complex in the nation; examples of visual aids have been prepared. Experienced specialists, workers from the local party and economic bodies and scientists have been invited for consultations and organizing talks.

We have shown particular concern for developing in the officers a need to systematically study the works of V. I. Lenin and the party documents. Here we have many unused reserves. Comrades are still encountered who do not go sufficiently into the content of the original sources and do not always outline what has been read skillfully. Such an attitude toward self-education leads to a situation where for years they mark time and do not grow ideologically. This is one of the reasons for the oversights and shortcomings in practical work and for failings in conduct.

The Political Directorate of the Rocket Troops is endeavoring to constantly improve the organization of Marxist-Leninist studies for the officer personnel and to increase its results. The questions related to the ideological tempering of the officer personnel are periodically discussed at sessions of the military council and are thoroughly studied during work in the troops. Increased attention is being given to Marxist-Leninist education by the political bodies and party organizations. For many of them it has become a rule to hear reports by communists on their increased ideological level, to popularize examples of conscientious study, to deal strictly with those who show a formal attitude toward the mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory and provide specific aid to the men in independent work with the original sources.

Let me refer to the experience of the party organization in the unit where Officer V. Shramenko is a bureau member. Here the party bureau closely follows the political education of the officers and their study of the urgent problems of party theory and practice in light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. It takes care that the exercises in Marxist-Leninist studies help the students more fully understand occurring events, to delve more deeply into the questions of organizing combat training and service and correctly combine organizational and ideological-indoctrinational work. The bureau members are constantly interested in the political studies of the communists and talk with them on the essence of the studied material. The results of the seminar exercises are discussed at party bureau sessions. It has become a system to hear reports by communists on their self-education. During the last training year, the party organizations and groups heard reports by all the leaders of the Marxist-Leninist study groups and one out of every two communists on these questions.

Well organized work in the area of the ideological tempering of the officers also tells positively on the results of combat and political training of the personnel. This unit ten times has won the title of outstanding. One out of every two officers is an outstanding man in military and political training while a majority of the commanders and political workers are masters of military affairs and high rating specialists.

In noting the positive features in the organization, content and methods of Marxist-Leninist training for the military personnel, we must not close our

ideas to the shortcomings existing in this area. We still have not seen to it that all the officers consistently and thoughtfully study Lenin's ideological and theoretical heritage or the party decisions and documents. In a number of places they have still not overcome the elements of isolating political studies from the daily practical activities of the military collectives or from the tasks of combat training and the strengthening of military discipline and proper order in the troops.

These and other omissions have been largely caused by insufficient work with the propaganda cadres. For example, in unit X, where Officer A. Pokid'ko serves, until recently little attention was given to improving the theoretical and procedural training of the group leaders. Seminars were held irregularly for them and there rarely was an exchange of work experience. The role of colloquiums on urgent political subjects, the reviews of military journals and information collections was underestimated. The officers from the political directorate have recently encountered similar shortcomings in the unit where Officer V. Skulin is the leader of the Marxist-Leninist study group.

The effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist studies, as has already been pointed out, is largely determined by the attention which the political bodies and party organizations pay to it. They must constantly introduce the experience of the best propagandists and the most advanced training procedures into practice and must decisively get rid of any manifestations of dogmatism, formalism or scholasticism in political studies. The task is to further raise the ideological and educational level of Marxist-Leninist studies of the officers, to develop in them a constant interest in the urgent problems of party theory and policy and see to it that ideological and theoretical studies contribute to the more successful carrying out of the practical tasks confronting our officer personnel in the area of the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

In being guided by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, by the party's instructions on further improving ideological, political and indoctrinational work as well as by the conclusions of the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the commanders, the political bodies and the party collectives of the Strategic Rocket Forces will in the future work for the greatest possible improvement in the ideological tempering of the officers and its increased influence on their service and sociopolitical activities as well as on the growth of professional activeness in the struggle to further increase vigilance and combat readiness in the troops.

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